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DEALING WITH OLD FATHER WILLIAM, OR
MOVING FROM CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT TO
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE: PROGRESS

CLAUSE REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT TERM
EXTENSION ACT
by Malla Pollack*
"You are old, Father William, "the young man said,
"And your hair has become very white;
And yet you incessantly stand on your headDo you think, atyour age, it is right?"
"In my youth, "Father William replied to his son,
"Ifearedit might injure the brain;
But, now that I'm perfectly sure I have none,
Why, I do it again and again."
"You are old," said the youth, "one would hardly suppose
That your eye was as steady as ever;
Yet you balanced an eel on the end ofyour noseWhat made you so awfully clever?"
"I have answered three questions, and that is enough,"
Said his father; "don'tgive yourselfairs!
Do you think I can listen all day to such stuff
Be off, or I'll kick you downstairs.!"'
* Visiting Associate Professor, University of Memphis, Cecil C.
Humphreys School of Law. My thanks for the research support of Northern
Illinois University School of Law and for helpful comments from Wendy
Gordon, Dennis Karjala, Tyler T. Ochoa, and Daniel E. Wanat. All errors are
my own. The argument in this Article is partially mirrored by Brief of Malla
Pollack, Amicus Curiae, Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01618 [hereinafter Brief of Pollack].
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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article suggests a textually appropriate, high standard of
review for legislation enacted pursuant to the Copyright and Patent
Clause, more properly the Progress Clause. 2 It is part of a written
symposium prompted by Eldred v. Ashcroft, 3 a case awaiting
argument before the United States Supreme Court that questions the
constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998
(CTEA). 4 If the Court holds for the government, it will need to reach
both the First Amendment 5 and the Progress Clause 6 issues. It can
hold for Eldred by reaching only one. Assuming a ruling for Eldred,
judicial economy 7 and restraint may counsel the Court to discuss
only the First Amendment, because the Court has ample precedent in
that area. I hope, however, that the Court will use Eldred to construe

1. LEWIS CARROLL,

ALICE'S ADVENTURES

IN

WONDERLAND

64-68

(1866), available at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/modeng/modengC.browse.html
(last visited July 30, 2002). "Old Father William" parodied a poem which was
well known to Carroll's contemporaries. See PARODIES: AN ANTHOLOGY
FROM CHAUCER TO BEERNBOHM-AND AFTER 277-93 (Dwight MacDonald

ed., 1960).
2. "Congress shall have the power ... To promote the Progress of Science
and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cf. 8 (a.k.a. "Copyright and Patent Clause," "Intellectual Property
Clause," or "Exclusive Rights Clause," but more properly the "Progress
Clause"). See Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?:
Defining "Progress" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States
Constitution, or Introducing The Progress Clause 80 NEB.

L. REV.

(forthcoming Spring 2002) (manuscript at 1 n. 1, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=304180 and http://eon.law.
harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/progress.htmi).
3. Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (U.S. oral argument Oct. 9, 2002).
4. Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998).
5. See Brief Amici Curiae of Copyright Law Professors in Support of
Petition, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (Questions Presented, "2. Are
copyright laws 'categorically immune' from First Amendment scrutiny?").
6. See id. (Question Presented "1. Does the language of Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 8
of the Constitution, giving Congress 'power... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts' impose substantive constraints on Congress's
enactments under that clause?").
7. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Forward: Implementing the Constitution,
111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 113-14 (1997) ("The task of crafting a new rule or
test-or even a serious proposal for one-is hard work .... And a failed effort
can be costly.").
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the Progress Clause because Congress needs assistance with this
important area of legislation.
From the point of view of the legal academician, both Congress
and the Supreme Court strongly resemble Old Father William. First,
both have power that they do not hesitate to use. Second, both
repeatedly get things upside down and backwards-though, of
course, different legal academicians would disagree on the set of
statutes and cases within the offending group. Third, the
Supreme
8
Court answers only those questions it chooses to answer.
In my opinion, Congress has been standing the Progress Clause
on its head for quite some time. 9 Like Old Father William, Congress
has abandoned earlier caution. The first Congress stepped gingerly
into this area,' 0 but more recent sessions of Congress have enacted
drastic changes with relative rapidity and little empirical study. 11

8. See U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1520 (2002) (describing
grant of certiorari as the Court's "agree[ing] to answer [petitioners']
question"); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (declining to reach
fully briefed issue of whether the Twenty-First Amendment prevents Congress
from enacting a national, minimum drinking age); Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (listing situations in which the
Court should decline to reach constitutional issues); CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 4-6, 262-63

(1999) (arguing that the Court generally should, and generally does, rule
narrowly); Fallon, supra note 7, at 113-16 (discussing practical problems
leading to judicial minimalism). But see Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured
ConstitutionalSteps, 71 IND. L.J. 297, 353 (1995) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court's
unique role in providing guidance and promoting uniformity justifies more
frequent departures from the rule of measured steps... in constitutional
adjudication.").
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10. The second session of the first Congress provided only a short term of
narrow exclusive rights for a few types of works. See Copyright Act of 1790,
ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
11. See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the
First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1, 67-81 (2001) (analyzing recent
acts over protecting copyright for rent-seeking purposes).
Congress
notoriously does not look at the facts allegedly supporting industry cries for
greater rights to exclude. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281, 281 (1970); Malla Pollack, The Right to

Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce
Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 89-97 (1999) (discussing lack of evidence

supporting Congress's "factual findings" in proposed database protection bill).
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Currently, Congress is focused on increasing the economic
reward to copyright holders.' 2 The underlying congressional power,
however, is "To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 13 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly taught that the prime objective of this Clause is
to benefit the public, not reward authors.14 Congress has the Clause
standing on its head.
My recent empirical research, 15 furthermore, revealed that the
1789 word "progress" means "spread." Congress was granted power
to pass only those copyright and patent statutes that promote the
dissemination of knowledge and technology to the public.
Therefore, the Clause is rightly called the "Progress Clause" because
its core purpose is the spread ("progress") of knowledge and
technology to all persons within the protection of the Constitution.
Emphatically, Congress has the Clause standing on its head.
This Article looks at a related problem,' 6 one the Supreme Court
has yet to answer: What is the correct standard for judicial review of
a federal statute's propriety pursuant to Congress's "progress
12. See S. REP. No. 104-315, at 3 (1996) (reciting purposes of CTEA).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994)
(Copyright's core purpose is "promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and other arts."); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 164 (1989) (clarifying that the Court's earlier preemption cases
"protect more than the right of the public to contemplate the abstract beauty of
an otherwise unprotected intellectual creation-they assure its efficient
reduction to practice and sale in the marketplace."); see also, e.g., Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574-76 (1994); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349, 354 (1991); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558, 563 (1985); id. at 580,
589 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81,
484 (1974); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973); Lee v. Runge,
404 U.S. 887, 890-93 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6, 9, 10 (1966); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring); Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932); Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 322, 327-29, 330 (1858); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654,
668 (1834); Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 320 (1833); Pennock v.
Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 13, 19, 21 (1829).
15. See Pollack, supra note 2.
16. See id. at 7 n.22 (reserving review standard issue for this Article).
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power"? I will attempt to distance this issue from my own reading of
the Clause. 17 Because this is a virgin area of constitutional theory,
my ambition is limited to suggesting a possible textual approach.' 8 I
will assume a Supreme Court 9acting in good faith, saying what it
means, and doing what it says.1
My approach is textual in the sense that I am basing the choice
of review standard on the structure of a document, 20 our written
Constitution. 2' My approach is textual for many reasons. First, the
17. Structural issues, however, require some integration. See infra notes
72-86, 195-203 and accompanying text.
18. The written U.S. Constitution may, of course, be interpreted in light of
the unwritten. See generally, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The New Unwritten
Constitution, 51 DUKE L.J. 289, 291 (2001) (discussing various versions of the
unwritten constitution including the Framers' possible belief in an ancient
unwritten English constitution of natural law, American fundamental values
theory, and Rehnquist Court federalism; any "no-unwritten-law proposition
would be nothing other than a proposition of unwritten constitutional law.").
19. See Fallon, supra note 7, at 126 (arguing that second best nature of
many Supreme Court decisions "may help to explain why some of the best
constitutional theory literature explicitly offers an idealized or reconstructed
account of constitutional adjudication, not a descriptive theory of what actually
happens.").
20. But see Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the
Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 123, 129 (2002)
("Identifying the right standard is of necessity an extra-textual act .... ").
21. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:
Reflections on Free-FormMethod in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 1221, 1236 (1995) (arguing that proper interpretation of the
Constitution "put[s] ... great emphasis upon text and structure, both the
structure within the text-the pattern and interplay in the language of the
Constitution itself and its provisions-and the structure (or architecture)
outside the text-the pattern and interplay in the governmental edifice that the
Constitution describes and creates, and in the institutions and practices it
propels."); see also MICHAEL CONANT, CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND
PURPOSES 2 (200 1) (calling for more judicial consideration of "[c]onstitutional

structure [which] requires treating the Constitution as a unified whole."); Akhil
Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 748 (1999) (calling for
"intratextualism" which "tries to read a contested word or phrase that appears
in the Constitution in light of another passage in the Constitution featuring the
same (or a very similar) word or phrase."). But see Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the
Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119 (1995) (arguing that "writtenness"
of the Constitution requires a temporally expanded, "commitmentarian"
approach which supports consideration of the purported evil leading to the
provision and judicial concentration on paradigm cases); see also JED
RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME (2001) (expanding on the same thesis).
Accepting Professor Rubenfeld's approach, however, I am not sure that any
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only unquestionable starting point is the text of the Constitution; it
constitutes the common denominator.22 Second, turning to text is
relatively unproblematic because the Progress Clause contains
unusually detailed constitutional text. Third, what little the Court has
stated about the fundamental goals of the Clause matches my reading
of its text. 23 Fourth, my view of the metavalues and social theory

American paradigm cases exist. Perhaps Eldred v. Ashcroft will fill that niche.
Backtracking to Rubenfeld's concern with the perceived evil, my substantive
view of the Progress Clause would make the CTEA unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Pollack, supra note 2 (arguing that distribution to the public is the core intent
of the Clause); Malla Pollack, Purveyance and Power or Over-Priced Free
Lunch: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Ally of the Takings Clause in
the Public's Control of Government, 30 Sw. U. L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter
Pollack, Purveyance and Power] (arguing that the Clause's tie to the Statute of
Monopolies makes it the enemy of "corruption," for example, wealth transfers
to those allied with the politically powerful); Malla Pollack, The Owned Public
Domain, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 265, 283-87 (2000) [hereinafter
Pollack, The Owned Public Domain] (arguing that the "property right"
underlying the Clause is the public's right to the public domain); see also
Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1135-36 (1998) (arguing that Rubenfeld's temporalextension view of the Constitution should lead to textualism as the proper
interpretive mode).
22. "[W]e begin with [the] text." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
519 (1997) (providing the Court's starting place for determining scope of
Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also, e.g., Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (looking at history only after
explaining the absence of any constitutional text precisely on point); Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in ConstitutionalAnalysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297,
319, 324 (1997) (discussing importance of textual basis for the Court's
acceptance or rejection of a statute's purpose). But see, e.g., T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
988-89 (1987) (complaining that under the now-standard balancing approach
"the Court largely ignores the usual stuff of constitutional interpretation-the
investigation and manipulation of texts (such as constitutional language
[etc.]."); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An
Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L.
REV. 917, 919-20 (1988) (arguing that constitutional basis of government
interests is just as shaky, or as firm, as the individual rights they are balanced
against); Gerald Gunther, Forward. In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
ChangingCourt: A Model for a Newer EqualProtection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
8-9 (1972) (discussing the Warren Court's willingness to protect fundamental
individual interests not expressly mentioned in the Constitution).
23. See Pollack, supra note 2, at text accompanying notes 58-63 (collecting
Supreme Court holdings based on Progress Clause limits).
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supporting the Clause also matches my reading of its text.24 Fifth,
any approach based on the drafting or ratification discussions
stumbles on the thinness of the record,25 as well as the record's
26
Sixth, a wider historical view also supports
possible unreliability.
my textual analysis. 27 Seventh, a textual approach to the review
standard might be useful even if the Court disagrees with my reading
them. 28
of the Clause's words and the policy choices underlying
Eighth, the textual approach has higher relevance because this
Article focuses on judicial review of federal statutes 9-legislation
enacted by institutions created and, therefore, defined and limited by
the Constitution.
The first Section of this Article discusses four types of
constraints imposed on federal statutes by the Constitution. Three
are textual: jurisdiction, form, and fence. A fourth consists of limits
24. See Pollack, supra note 2, at Parts I.C. 1., I.C.2. (discussing the Progress
Clause in the context of federalist belief structures and an evolving
Constitution).
25. See Pollack, Purveyance and Power, supra note 21, at 99-116
(discussing available information on Progress Clause issues in the drafting and
ratifying of the U.S. Constitution and drafting of the Bill of Rights).
26. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of
the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986) (discussing possible
inaccuracy of basic documents; "some [documents] have been compromisedperhaps fatally-by the editorial interventions of hirelings and partisans. To
recover original intent from these records may be an impossible hermeneutic
assignment.").
27. I have already written at length on the ancestral Statute of Monopolies.
The Framers' whig vision of government emerged from Parliament's fight for
control with the early Stuart monarchs. Central to Parliament's ability to
control Crown policy was its ability to control the Crown's purse. The Statute
of Monopolies was the first win in Parliament's battle to cut the Crown off
from sources of supply outside Parliament's control. These same indirect
taxation methods, furthermore, were inefficient at funding government
projects. They excelled, however, at lining private pockets. See Pollack,
Purveyance and Power, supra note 21, passim.
28. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 24 (Amy
Gutman ed., 1997) (defining his own constitutional analysis as textual). But
see Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at 292-93 (arguing that current allegedly
textualist justices "are prepared to invoke unwritten law when it suits a
'conservative' agenda"; but adding that "unenumerated constitutional rights
are not per se illegitimate.").
29. Cf Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 781, 876-77 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("I know of no authority whatever for [the Supreme Court's]
specifying the precise form that state legislation must take, as opposed to its
constitutionally required content.").
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implied from the intended structure of the government institutions
created by the document. This Article's second Section presents a
highly generalized flow chart of judicial review of federal statutes,
distinguishing three moves: definition, identification of the statute's
means and goals, and comparison of the statute to the Constitution.
Section three applies both analytic approaches to the language of the
Progress Clause. Section four argues that Eldred, like Brown v.
Board of Education,30 is a proper case for the Supreme Court to
provide more than minimal guidance to the other branches of
government.
The main thesis of this Article is that the Constitution's drafters
chose uniquely limiting text for the Progress Clause, signaling the
appropriateness of strong judicial review of statutes enacted pursuant
to this tightly cabined power.
II. STRUCTURE OF THE TEXT

The Supreme Court may review a federal statute for different
types of unconstitutionality, including problems with jurisdiction,
form, fence, and institutional structure. This Section proposes five
conclusions related to this topology:
A. Eldreddoes not raise a jurisdictional issue;
B. Eldred's form issue is not novel;
C. The constitutional text closest to the Progress Clause's fence
structure is the Appropriate Legislation Formula of various postCivil War amendments;
D. However, no well-litigated constitutional provision shares the
full architecture of the Progress Clause; and
E. The importance of the Clause's unusual design is supported
by both structural concerns and historical background.
Let us now consider my support for these five intermediate
conclusions.
A. Jurisdiction
"Jurisdiction" is the scope of Congress's reach under the
constitutional power being exercised. What subset of the world may

30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Congress regulate? 3 1 The most litigated constitutional jurisdiction
issue is2 probably the scope of "commerce among the several
3
states."
The Court has discussed some of the jurisdictional hedges in the
Progress Clause. In 1879, the Court held that use-based trademarks
were outside the jurisdictional scope of the Clause because such
marks are neither the "Writings" of "Authors" nor the "Discoveries"
of "Inventors." 33 Much more recently, the Court placed facts and
"sweat works" outside the Clause's reach.3 4
Eldred, however, does not present a jurisdictional issue. The
CTEA merely extends terms for works that are already covered by
other federal copyright enactments; it does not determine which res
are copyrightable.
B. Form
"Form" refers to constitutional requirements on formal or
technical aspects of the statutes Congress may enact. For example,
35
bankruptcy laws and naturalization rules must be "uniform."
"Armies" may not extend
Appropriations of money for supporting
36
years."
two
than
Term
longer
a
"for
Eldred does raise a form issue: the meaning of "limited Times."
As discussed below, 3 7 based on Bankruptcy Clause cases, I believe
Eldred's form issue is solvable in the first step of review: definition
of terms.

31. Whether Congress may regulate the material outside the scope of one
clause in reliance on another power is discussed below as implied external
fencing. See infra Part II.C.2.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. But see Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking
ConstitutionalFederalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795, 807-08 (1995) (pointing out

that the New Deal Court actually expanded the Necessary and Proper Clause as
applied to the Commerce Clause).
33. See The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (holding that use-based
trademarks are not protectable pursuant to Congress's copyright power because
they are not the "Writings" of "Authors").
34. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
(stating that facts and mere sweat works are not copyrightable because they are
not the "Writings" of "Authors").
35. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
36. Id. cl. 12.
37. See infra Part III.A.
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C. Fences
A "fence" is a policy-based limit that affirmatively blocks
congressional action. 38 Using textual categories, constitutional
powers may be fenced in multiple ways. This Article discusses four:
express external fences, implied external fences, express internal
fences, and the Appropriate Legislation Formula. This last category
is a distinct textual structure first employed in the Reconstruction
Amendments: sections empowering Congress (or Congress and the
states) to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation. 39 The
Constitution is also bounded by "structural fences," which are those
fences constructed by the intended interaction of the government
institutions created by the Constitution.
The fence issue in Eldred involves the section of the Clause that
the D.C. Circuit held powerless: "To promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts."40 This phrase is both an express
internal fence and a structural fence.
1. Express external fences
First, powers may be expressly fenced by other clauses. The
paradigmatic external fence issue is a conflict between individual
rights and government interests. 41 For example, the Commerce
Clause gives Congress the power to enact a statute regulating how
commodity X may be marketed in interstate commerce. The Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment may prevent Congress from
confiscating large stockpiles of X without compensation. The equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment may prevent
Congress from treating stockpiles of X differently based on the race
38. "Jurisdiction," in contrast, refers to locating the point where Congress
runs out of power despite the absence of blocking fences. See Paul J. Heald &
Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power. The Intellectual
Property Clause As An Absolute Constrainton Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv.
1119, 1181-83 (2000) (contrasting Congress's running out of power with
Congress's power being affirmatively blocked).
39. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, XVIII, XIX, XXIII, XXIV,
XXVI.
40. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted
sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. 1072 (2002).
41. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of
Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 711

(1994) ("Contemporary constitutional law presents most constitutional
conflicts as ones between individual rights and state interests.").
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of their respective owners. For express external fences, the Court
has developed a three-tier review 4 2system:
rational basis,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.

2. Implied external fences
Second, clauses may be implicitly fenced in by other clauses.
For example, database legislation presents the implied external fence
issue of whether the jurisdictional limit announced in Feist
Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.43 may be bypassed
44
by legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause.

The general rule is that a limit in one clause may not be
bypassed by congressional action supposedly taken under another.
In Railway Executives Ass'n v. Gibbons, the unanimous Court

disallowed use of the Commerce Clause as authority to enact a
statute governing the insolvency of one named railroad: "Thus, if we
were to hold that Congress had the power to enact non-uniform
bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would
eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress

42. The common three-tier description is a simplification. See R. Randall
Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related
Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The "Base Plus Six"
Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 226
(2002) (asserting that the Court has six to seven levels of review). Much of
this doctrine reduces to forbidding certain types of action taken for
impermissible purposes. See Pildes, supra note 41, at 712; see also, e.g.,
William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54
STAN. L. REV. 87, 91 (2001) ("As with other forms of heightened scrutiny,
legislative record review appears designed to smoke out illegitimate
purposes.").
43. 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (announcing that Congress may not protect facts or
sweat works pursuant to the Progress Clause).
44. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database
Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of
Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 539-52 (2000)
(discussing constitutional problems with proposed database statutes); Pollack,
supra note 11, at 56-79 (discussing the same constitutional problems). But see
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of
Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (1997)
(arguing that additional database protection is unnecessary); Jane C. Ginsburg,
No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After
Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992) (arguing that a
Commerce Clause-based database statute is constitutionally allowable if it is
distinguishable from copyright statutes).
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to enact bankruptcy laws."4 5 This general principle,4 6 of course, does
extent of each purported
not foreclose arguments over the particular
47
Congress."
of
power
the
"limitation on
The Necessary and Proper Clause is, presumably, also bound by
implied external fences. Chief Justice Marshall clarified that this
clause may not be used to "adopt measures which are prohibited by
the constitution" or "pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not
As Madison explained, the
entrusted to the government. 4 8
49
Necessary and Proper Clause expands Congress's choice of means.

45. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-69 (1982).
While the judgment was unanimous, two justices concurred on a possibly
narrower basis.
I conclude that the Clause permits such legislation if Congress finds
that the application of the law to a single debtor (or limited class of
debtors) serves a national interest apart from the economic interests of
that debtor or class, and if the identified national interest justifies
Congress's failure to apply the law to other debtors.
1d. at 474 (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Brennan, J.). I read the
concurrence as allowing a more flexible definition of "uniform."
46. Eldred deals with a form limit: "limited Times." However, Feist
announced a jurisdictional limit: the boundaries of what res are copyrightable.
499 U.S. 340 (1991). Currently, I see no reason to treat the implied external
fence issue differently as to the form and jurisdiction limits of the Progress
Clause.
47. Some courts have read Gibbons narrowly or overlooked it.
Downgrading Gibbons allows a court to read The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S.
82 (1879), as allowing Congress to use the now-widened Commerce Clause
power to augment the progress power. See United States v. Moghadam, 175
F.3d 1269, 1273-81 (11 th Cir. 1999) (upholding federal statute criminalizing
unauthorized fixation of unfixed public performances despite claim that
Progress Clause's term "Writings" of "Authors" bars protection of unfixed
works; holding that statute was authorized by the Commerce Clause despite
Gibbons); Authors League of America, Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220, 224 (2d
Cir. 1986) (holding that manufacturing clause of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 601 is constitutional as exercise of the Commerce Power, without
mentioning Gibbons); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111,
1137-42 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that, even though the statute protects works
of authors by a means other than one listed in the Progress Clause, the
Commerce Clause is a sufficient basis for Digital Millennium Copyright Act's
ban on manufacturing and distributing certain circumvention technology,
relying on Moghadam).
48. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
49. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 455 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (According to
Madison when presenting his suggestions to the first Congress, a Bill of Rights
might be useful because the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress
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While he did not expound further, the best reading is that the
Necessary and Proper Clause expands only the allowable means of
reaching already constitutionally legitimate goals; it may not be used

as permission to target a goal not included in the Constitution.
Otherwise, Gibbons should have5 included a separate discussion of
the Necessary and Proper Clause. 0
3. Express internal fences
An express internal fence is, as its name indicates, a fence stated
by the language of the clause being limited. The Progress Clause
contains an express internal fence: "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts ...

."

Such a fence is quite rare in the

Constitution. 51

The fence, therefore, deserves high value for
original
its unusually emphatic textual placement-even without reaching
policy issues.
Inside Article I, the closest text may be the Militia Clauses,52 but
these powers exist within a web of interacting directions that include
both other congressional powers and express limitations on the
states.53 The Second Amendment opens with text that discusses
"certain discretionary powers with respect to the means, which may admit of
abuse to a certain extent .... ).
50. The D.C. Circuit did invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause to support
its holding that the CTEA is valid. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d at 378-79
(asserting that even if preamble to Copyright Clause has impact, the CTEA
would still be justified as a necessary and proper application of the Copyright
Clause power). But that circuit used the Necessary and Proper Clause to allow
a more flexible reading of "limited Times," not to bypass that requirement by
locating an additional power within the Necessary and Proper Clause.
51. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (describing the
Progress Clause as only subpart of Article I that "describes both [its]
objective ...

and [its] means ....

).

52. The Congress shall have power...
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and
for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of
the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15, 16.
53. The other relevant federal powers include U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls.
10-14. The states are relevantly limited by U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cls. 1-3.
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purpose, 54 but that amendment does not create a governmental
power.
4. The power to enforce an amendment by appropriate legislation
Eight amendments to the Constitution contain a subpart giving
Congress "power to enforce [the amendment] by appropriate
legislation," 55 or "the Appropriate Legislation Formula" (ALF). This
formulation appears for the first time in the Enforcement Clause of
the Thirteenth Amendment. The Appropriate Legislation Formula is
the constitutional text-structure closest to the Progress Clause.
Amendments containing the Appropriate Legislation Formula are
similar to the Progress Clause because they contain both the grant of
a power and an express internal fence. Such amendments differ from
the Progress Clause in the nature of the fence. The text of the
express internal fence in the Progress Clause specifies one (and only
one) legitimate goal; the ALF expressly allows an unspecified set of
As for the inter-relationship of these provisions, see Perpich v. Dep't of Def.,
496 U.S. 334 (1990) (upholding federal power to order state National Guard to
training exercises outside the borders of the United States); Cox v. Wood, 247

U.S. 3 (1918) (upholding Congress's power to order a draftee to serve outside
the United States.); The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918)
(holding the Selective Service Act constitutional).
54. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S.
CONST. amend. II. The meaning of the Second Amendment's purpose-

language is unsettled. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937-38 (1997)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (pointing out unsettled nature of right created by
Second Amendment); see also United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th
Cir. 2001) (creating circuit split by construing Second Amendment to create a
personal right to keep weapons, a right which is not limited to individuals
enrolled in any militia or military unit, but which may be regulated), cert.
denied, 122 S.Ct. 2362 (June 10, 2002) (including Question No. 3, a Second
Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)); Brief for the United States in

Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203
(5th Cir. 2001) (No. 01-8780), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
osg/briefs/2001/0responses/2001-8780.resp.html (agreeing that the Second
Amendment creates individual right, but denying its violation by 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8)); Brief for the United States in Opposition to Petition for
Certiorari, United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2001) (No. 018272), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2001/0responses/20018272.resp.html (same).
55. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, § 2, XIV, § 5, XV, § 2, XVIII, § 2, XIX, §

2, XXIII § 2, XXIV, § 2, XXVI, § 2. One also gives this power to the states.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2.
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means. This distinction, however, should not be pushed too far.
Means and goals are addressed in the text of the Progress Clause;
means and goals are addressed within each of the ALF amendments.
The meaning of the Appropriate Legislation Formula reflects its
template, the Necessary and Proper Clause. 56 According to the
Court, "[b]y including § 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment,] the
draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision
applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers
expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18 .
Preliminary drafts of the Fourteenth Amendment had used the words
"necessary and proper" as opposed to "appropriate legislation." 58
Chief Justice Marshall's explication of "necessary and proper"
included "appropriate." 59 According to the Court, the change in the
Enforcement Clause's language from "necessary and proper" to
"appropriate" did not limit the breadth of the power granted to
Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment.60
The Necessary and Proper Clause expands the set of means
available to Congress to reach already legitimate goals.
The
Appropriate Legislation Formula also deals with allowable means for
a specified end: the realization of the institutional change required or
allowed by the specific amendment. Arguably changing course
sharply, the Court recently limited Congress's discretion under the
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("Congress shall have Power... To make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.").
57. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966).
58. Id. at 650 n.9; see also, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 439-44 (1968) (relating the Appropriate Legislation Formula of the
Thirteenth Amendment to the Necessary and Proper Clause); Lambert v.
Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596-97 (1926) (relating the Appropriate Legislation
Formula of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Necessary and Proper Clause);
David E. Engdahl, The Necessary and ProperClause as an Intrinsic Restraint
on Federal Lawmaking Power, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 107, 116-17
(1998) ("[T]he Enforcement Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was
crafted in explicit analogy to the Necessary and Proper Clause ...."). But see
Amar, supra note 21, at 823 (viewing Jones as largely inconsistent with City of
Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
59. "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional." M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
60. See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 650 n.9.
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Appropriate Legislation Formula of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 1
The Court has yet to clarify if this constriction will carry over to the
ALF within the seven other amendments or to the ALF's template,
the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The relevant express internal fence in the Progress Clause limits
the range of legitimate goals to one: "promot[ing] the Progress of
Science and useful Arts." 62 Of course, the Clause also names
specific means: "securing" 63 "exclusive Right[s]" which exist only
for "limited Times" and are granted to "Authors" and "Inventors" in
"their respective Writings and Discoveries." 64 The major difference
between the eight amendments containing the ALF and the Progress
Clause is the flexibility of the walls around Congress's power.
None of these amendments are as tightly cabined as the Progress
Clause. All of them contain expandable words. At the very least,
each contains the flexible word "appropriate." "Appropriate," like
that protean word "reasonable,"
changes meaning with
circumstances. A writer uses "reasonable" (or "appropriate") as
opposed to "five percent over retail cost" because the written
document has temporal extension into a world the writer cannot
imagine and does not want to stifle with anachronistic assumptions.
The set of circumstances within the word's meaning is relative,
related to (thus, dependent on) the changeable facts of the world,
sometimes including the opinions of people. Relative words such as
"due care" in tort law are the core of many legal doctrines. 65 True,
61. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 (limiting Congress's Fourteenth

Amendment Enforcement Clause power to the enforcement of pre-existing

constitutional rights).
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
63. "Secure" would be another express internal fence if it meant "to protect
pre-existing rights." Cf U.S. CONST. amend. VII (" [T]he right of trial by jury
shall be preserved. . . .") (emphasis added); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 459 (1977) (relying on
"preserved" to reiterate that the Seventh Amendment "did not purport to
require a jury trial where none was required before").

"Secure," however,

gives Congress power to create new rights. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 591, 661 (1834).

64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
65. [C]onformity to custom is not in itself the exercise of due care...
[S]ince negligence is the failure to do that which an ordinarily prudent
man would do, or the doing of that which an ordinarily prudent man
would not do, under the same circumstances, an ordinary custom,
while relevant.., is not conclusive [on the issue of negligence].
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"five percent over retail cost" does change monetary value as the
retail cost varies. "Five percent over retail cost," however, is not as
flexible as "a reasonable rate" or "an appropriate rate." Similarly,
while the words in the Progress Clause have some play, they are not
"appropriate," 66 "due process, ' 67 or "equal protection
as flexible as
68
of the law."
Certainly, some constitutional commands are clearer and more
exact than the Progress Clause. Generally, however, these are
commands to perform (or not perform) discrete acts, 69 such as not
blocking eighteen-year-olds from voting,70 or assembling Congress
each year on a prescribed date. 71 For a discretionary constitutional
power, the progress power is extraordinarily cabined.
5. Structural fences
The Constitution's text creates institutional structures. Different
understandings of the intended power configuration impact readers'
disparate understandings of the document. 72 A thin majority of the
73
current Court is strongly protective of state prerogatives.
Moody v. Southland Inv. Corp., 190 S.E.2d 578, 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972)
(reversing directed verdict for defendant landlord who used sheet glass in a
door, like many landlords of similar buildings).
66. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, § 2, XIV, § 5, XVIII, § 2, XIX, § 2, XXIII,
§ 2, XXVI, § 2.
67. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. But see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTHTH AMENDMENT

190-97 (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that "due process" and "equal protection of the
law" had precise, technical meaning for drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
69. See Charles Fried, Types, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 55, 56-68 (1997)
(dividing constitutional cabining of Congress into commands regarding intents,
effects, and discrete acts).
70. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
71. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 ("first Monday in December, unless
they shall by Law appoint a different Day"); id. amend. XX, § 2 ("at noon on
the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day").
72. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 21, at 1249-1302 (providing example of
how to integrate textual analysis with respect for structure of intended
government institutions).
73. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (resting on
votes of these five justices); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (same);
Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (same). See generally, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A.
Young, Federalism and the Double Standardof JudicialReview, 51 DUKE L.J.

354

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:337

Textually, 74 however, the Court has no more right to expand the
language of the Eleventh Amendment 75 than to add penumbras to the
Bill of Rights.7 6 The Court's federalists, however, view the states'
sovereignty as fifty structural fences-foundational supports whose
repair is required to preserve the architectural design of the
government constructed in 1789 (albeit with fewer states):
[E]ven as to matters within the competence of the National
Government, the constitutional design secures the founding

generation's

rejection

of the concept of a central

government that would act upon and through the States in
favor of a system in which the State and Federal
Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the
people-who were, in Hamilton's words, the only proper

objects of government.

77

75, 78-80 (2001) (discussing with approval the Court's post-1994, more
protective attitude towards federalism).
In addition to voiding congressional action so as to preserve federalism,
the Court commonly requests a clear congressional statement before reading a
federal statute as intending to tread on the states' toes. See Dan T. Coenen, A
Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with SecondLook Rules of InterbranchDialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1603-30
(2001).
74. But see, e.g., Thomas B. McAffee, A Critical Guide to the Ninth
Amendment, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 65 (1996) ("The traditional view of the

Ninth Amendment... can only be understood when placed against the
backdrop of the arguments used to defend the decision of the Constitution's
framers to omit a bill of rights.").
75. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."). But see Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (admitting that the Court has enforced broader sovereign
immunity for the states than granted by the text of the Eleventh Amendment).
76. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("[S]pecific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance.").
77. Alden, 527 U.S. at 714 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, stating:
[T]he sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is
limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the
Constitution's structure, its history, and the authoritative
interpretations by this Court make clear, the States' immunity from
suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States
enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they
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My current point is not to approve or disapprove any specific
claim of government design. My point is that analysis based on
institutional structure is less constrained than analysis based on the
structure of the written text. I have chosen, therefore, to discuss the
structural approach only secondarily, while pointing out its
amorphousness.78
In structural terms, the Progress Clause is a foundational
command that knowledge ("Science"), technology ("useful Arts"),
writings, and discoveries may not be treated as mere commercial
products; the creation and dissemination of these res are necessary to
the continued viability of a republican polity. 79 As a structural
matter, therefore, Congress's power to enact copyright statutes does
retain today... except as altered by the plan of the Convention or
certain constitutional Amendments.
1d. at 713; see also id. at 728 ("[S]overeign immunity derives not from the
Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution
itself."); id. at 729 ("[I]t follows that the scope of the States' immunity from
suit is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment alone but by fundamental
postulates implicit in the constitutional design.").
78. The Supreme Court's doctrine on the interrelationship between the
Militia Clauses and the other constitutional provisions relating to military
matters might be read to demonstrate that text trumps arguments of implied
structure.
Were it not for the Militia Clauses [U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15,
16], it might be possible to argue on like [structural] grounds that the
constitutional allocation of powers precluded the formation of
organized state militia. The Militia Clauses, however, subordinate any
such structural inferences to an express permission while also
subjecting state militia to express federal limitations.
Perpich, 496 U.S. at 353-54 (footnotes omitted). However, I must conclude
the text/structure relationship is unsettled (and unsettling) in light of the
Court's less textual reading of, e.g., the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g.,
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363 (admitting that the Supreme Court's case law has
extended the language of the Eleventh Amendment).
79. "[I]t has long been a basic tenet of national communications policy that
the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public." Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC,
520 U.S. 180, 192 (1997) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Many scholars have highlighted the Court's control of outcomes through
undiscussed categorization of information as commercial product or nexus of
First Amendment protected speech. See, e.g., James Boyle, A Theory of Law
and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL.
L. REV. 1413 (1992); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech,
Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights,
33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 665 (1992).
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not include the power to enact statutes for merely economic
purposes. The textual hook for this structural argument is the
contrast between clause 8 and the relatively unfenced powers created
by other clauses of Article I, Section 8. True, the inclusion of a
separate power over writings and inventions could rest on the desire
to have national treatment of all such res, including those not moving
in interstate, foreign, or Indian commerce. Such intent, however,
would support only much simpler language, such as "Congress
shall
' 8°
have the Power... To promote Writings and Discoveries.
Thinking structurally, later amendments to the Constitution
reinforce the limitations cabining Congress's Progress Clause power.
The First Amendment gives special protection against government
interference with speech and press-increasing the acknowledged
importance of distributing knowledge and writings for reasons
unrelated to economics. The Fourteenth Amendment both expands
the First Amendment's protection to bar action by the states, 81 and
inserts into the Constitution the Declaration of Independence's
equality axiom. The Thirteenth Amendment supports this change in
the relative constitutional importance of people and private
property. 82 Under the original Constitution, states received some
voting power based on the number of slaves within their borders.83
80. "Promote" must be used rather than the "regulate" of the Commerce
Clause in order to satisfy federalist claims that Congress had no power to
muzzle the press even without a bill of rights. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 38
(James Madison), No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
81. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000).

The Court has held that the Progress Clause does not cabin the states. See
Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 560-61 (1973). But see Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional
Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellectual Property and Commerce
Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar
Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 259, 300-26 (1995) (arguing that the Progress

Clause-a.k.a. the "Intellectual Property Clause"-should be read to restrict
the states).
82. The Framers' belief in the importance of preserving imbalances in
private property is (in)famous.
PROPERTY

AND THE

See, e.g., JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE
LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE

MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 3 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1990)
(asserting that the Framers' "effort to protect property and [wealth] inequality
from democratic revisions... has had distorting consequences.").
83. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives... shall be
apportioned among the several States... according to their respective
Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free
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By outlawing slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment theoretically ended
all congressional representation of property. The tilt towards people
was enhanced by each extension of the franchise, 84 by the end of poll
taxes, 85 and the gradual enlargement of public participation in
choosing officials. 86 The simultaneous input of these constitutional
clauses should result in much higher judicial protection for the
public's right not to be excluded for merely economic reasons by
holders of statutory grants over "Writings" and "Discoveries" in
"Science and useful Arts."

This entire Section has provided a basic taxonomy of textual
constrictions that the Court might compare to a statute. The next
Section presents a highly abstract flow chart of judicial review. Both
analyses will then be applied to the Progress Clause in Section IV.
III. PERFORMING CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF A STATUTE

The Supreme Court's logic tree 87 includes three basic moves:

defining terms, identifying the statute's means and goals, and finally,
comparing what Congress has done 88 with what Congress has been
empowered (or commanded) to do by the Constitution. The key to
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.").
84. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged.., on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude."); id. amend. XIX, § 1 ("on account of sex");
id. amend. XXIII, § I (allowing residents of District of Columbia to vote for
president and vice-president); id. amend. XXVI, § I ("The right of citizens of
the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be
denied or abridged., on account of age.").
85. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § I ("The right of citizens of the
United States to vote.., shall not be denied or abridged.., by reason of
failure to pay poll tax or other tax.").
86. See id. amend. XII; id. amend. XVII (making election of senators more
direct); id. amend. XX, §§ 1, 2 (cutting down power of lame-duck
Congresspersons); id. amend. XXII, § 1 (providing presidential term limit);
id. amend. XXVII (preventing congresspersons from raising their own salaries
without electoral feedback).
87. The suggested logic tree is not tied to any specific type of doctrinal test.
See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 7, at 77-87 (discussing eight types of tests and
their relationships to the practical problems of collegial adjudication in areas of
reasonable disagreement).
88. "What Congress has done" may be judged in terms of purpose, effects,
or discreet acts. See Fried, supra note 69, at 56-68 (explaining these "types").
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the third step is the level of independent decision-making the Court
the key is the level of deference the
will employ. Stated in reverse,
89
Congress.
give
will
Court
A. FirstStep: Definitions

The Supreme Court's first step is defining the terms in the
Constitution." In many cases no definition is at issue. The Court,
however, is the institution that chooses whether a seemingly
quiescent word is due for examination. Furthermore, as the Court
has recently emphasized, the Court, not Congress, has the power and
definition by itself
duty to define constitutional words. 91 Sometimes
92
puzzle.
constitutional
a
is sufficient to resolve
89. See Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 42, passim (arguing that the Court's

recent hard looks at the legislative record are inappropriate carry-overs from
the different institutional setting of reviewing rule making by administrative
agencies).
90. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,

122 S. Ct. 1465, 1478 (2002) (In determining whether government action
affecting property is an unconstitutional deprivation of ownership rights under

the Just Compensation Clause, a court must interpret the word "taken." When
the government condemns or physically appropriates the property, the fact of a

taking is typically obvious and undisputed.

When, however, the owner

contends a taking has occurred because a law or regulation imposes restrictions

so severe that they are tantamount to a condemnation or appropriation, the
predicate of a taking is not self-evident, and the analysis is more complex.);
id. at 1483 (refusing petitioner's "circular" suggestion that the "property"
interest taken be defined temporally to match the "terms of the very regulation
being challenged").
91. If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth
Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution be "superior
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means." It would be "on a level
with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts,... alterable when the
legislature shall please to alter it." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803). "Under this approach, it is difficult to conceive of a principle that
would limit congressional power." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529

(1997).
92. Policy decisions may be hidden inappropriately within the undiscussed
formation of some definitions, but as discussed above, this Article purposely
eschews such issues. Legal definition is not, per se, inappropriate judicial
activity. As Charles Fried has so aptly pointed out, legal definition may be
constitutive of values and may involve analogy from paradigms. See Fried,

supra note 69, at 81-82. Definition by analogy may allow the Court to bypass
the theoretical problems of judicial interest balancing. See, e.g., Aleinikoff,

supra note 22, at 945 ("[H]op[ing] to raise enough questions about the form
and implications of balancing to force a re-opening of the balancing debate.").
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Defining a previously overlooked constitutional word is a potent
power. The Court started a revolution in doctrine when it recently
defined "enforce," in the fifth clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
as providing Congress with merely remedial power. 93 Congress was
admonished that it could not "alter" the life, liberty, or property
rights protected by the Amendment; it could merely enforce them by
appropriate legislation, meaning legislation with "congruence and
proportionality" between injury and statutory remedy. 94 Later cases
explicated "appropriate legislation" as requiring the judiciary to put
95
factual bite into the requirement of congruence and proportionality.
As for the Progress Clause, the Court has never defined "limited
Times." "Limited Times" is a form issue; the same type of issue
raised by "uniform" in the Bankruptcy Clause. The Bankruptcy
Clause cases demonstrate that the Court is most likely to solve the
"limited Times" issue at the definitional first step, and to do so
without admitting the complexity of the underlying policy choices.
To support this conclusion, I now discuss the relevant Bankruptcy
Clause cases in chronological order.
Under the Bankruptcy Clause, Congress has the power "[t]o
establish.., uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies

93. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law:
FederalAntidiscriminationLegislation After Morrison and Kimmel, 110 YALE
L.J. 441, 522 (2000) (arguing that the Court is illegitimately imposing
constraints on Congress that were originally constructed to constrain the antidemocratic process of judicial review: "the Court is now embarking on a
project that it has not pursued since the first Reconstruction: the task of
cabining and inhibiting democratic vindication of equality values.").
94. City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20. But see Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (allowing broader power to Congress under
identically worded clause in the Thirteenth Amendment).
95. See generally Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000). These new definitions have added importance because of the Court's
recent announcement that Congress lacks the power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity under its Article I powers; it may only force states to stand suit
pursuant to the now-narrowed power to enforce amendments by appropriate
legislation. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see also Fed.
Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S.Ct. 1864, 1868 (2002) (holding
"that state sovereign immunity bars" a federal administrative agency "from
adjudicating a private party's complaints" against unconsenting states); Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759-60 (1999) (holding that Congress may not force
states to hear private law suits against themselves in their own state courts).
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throughout the United States." 96 The first Supreme Court case
discussing "uniform" in this clause is Ogden v. Saunders, which
dealt with how much power remained in states to enforce their
insolvency statutes. 97 In dicta, Justice Johnson explained:
The general tendency of the legislation of the States at that
time [1780s] to favour the debtor, was a consideration
which entered deeply into many of the provisions of the
constitution. And as the power of the States over the law of
their respective forums remained untouched by any other
provision of the constitution; when vesting in Congress the
power to pass a bankrupt law; it was worthy of the wisdom
of the Convention to add to it the power to make that
system uniform and universal.98 Yet, on this subject, the
use of the term uniform, instead of general, may well raise
a doubt whether it meant more than that such a law should
not be partial,but have 99
an equal and uniform application in
Union.
the
of
part
every
The same construction is proffered in Nelson v. Carland 00 In
Nelson, Chief Justice Taney announced the Court's dismissal of the
10
case for lack of statutorily granted appellate jurisdiction.'
Dissenting, Justice Carton expressed his belief that the Framers
placed bankruptcy power in Congress because otherwise no
"uniform" law would exist; instead, each state would go its own
way. 10 2 As then administered by separate judicial districts without
the Supreme Court's "revising power," Justice Carton believed that
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
97. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 213 (1827). The reporter
includes long summaries of the parties' arguments and seriatim opinions by
several Justices.
98. Interestingly, Justice Johnson here implies that Congress may be
allowed, but not required, to make federal bankruptcy statutes "uniform."
None of the later cases in this line, however, expressly rests the Court's
willingness to allow great flexibility within the word "uniform" on the claim
that "uniform" is not a binding limitation. See id. at 274 (Johnson, J.,
concurring).
99. Id. at 274 (Johnson, J., concurring) (footnote added).
100. 42 U.S. (1 How.) 265 (1843).
101. See id. at 265-66 (dismissing on ground that Congress had not granted
appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court).
102. See id. at 269 (Carton, J., dissenting) ("It was apprehended, at least, that
[bankruptcy laws] would not be uniform, unless Congress had the power to
make them so.").
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"[s]o far from being 'a uniform system of bankruptcy,' in its
administration, it has become, by the various and conflicting
constructions put upon it, little more uniform than the different and
conflicting state insolvent laws."'10 3
Therefore, Justice Carton
wanted to construe the federal statute as intending to grant the Court
04
appellate jurisdiction.'
The Supreme Court's first relevant holding is Hanover National
Bank v. Moyses.105 The questioned statute led to geographically
varying results because it incorporated state law in certain
particulars. 10 6 The Hanover Court asserted that the laws allowed by
the Constitution "must... be uniform throughout the United States,
but that uniformity is geographical and not personal ....
We ... hold that the system is, in the constitutional sense,
uniform throughout the United States, when the trustee
takes in each State whatever would have been available to
the creditors if the bankrupt law had not been passed. The
general operation of the law is uniform although it may
08
result in certain particulars differently in different States.'

103. Id. at 276.
104. See id.
105. 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
106. See id.; see also Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918)
("Notwithstanding this requirement as to uniformity[,] the bankruptcy acts of
Congress may recognize the laws of the State in certain particulars, although
such recognition may lead to different results in different States.").
107. Hanover, 186 U.S. at 188.
108. Id. at 190. Hanover relied on two lower court opinions expressing the
same conclusion without any explanation beyond (i) the interaction between
local law and all contracts, and (ii) the allegedly obvious meaning of the
constitutional phrase. See In re Deckert, 7 F. Cas. 334 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1874)
(No. 3728); In re Beckerford, 3 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mo. 1870) (No. 1209).
Justice Frankfurter later repeated this conclusion without adding any
substantive analysis:
The Constitutional requirement of uniformity is a requirement of
geographical uniformity.
It is wholly satisfied when existing
obligations of a debtor are treated alike by the bankruptcy
administration throughout the country, regardless of the State in which
the bankruptcy court sits. To establish uniform laws of bankruptcy
does not mean wiping out the differences among the forty-eight States
in their laws governing commercial transactions ....
These
differences [between state laws] inherent in our federal scheme the
day before a bankruptcy are not wiped out or transmuted the day after.
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Next, in International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, in 1929, the Court held
that Congress preempted the field when it passed bankruptcy
statutes, thus superceding existing state laws as opposed to providing
debtors with a choice between state and national systems. 10 9 "The
enforcement of state insolvency systems, whether held to be in
pursuance of statutory provisions or otherwise, would necessarily
conflict with the national purpose to have uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.""' 0
Nothing was said about the somewhat similar lack of uniformity
that Hanover allowed. Neither Hanover nor International Shoe
discussed the possibility that the Constitution requires Congress to
level differences between what "the trustee takes in each State"' 1 as
the quid pro quo for enacting a national bankruptcy code which
preempts state insolvency laws.
In Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago,
Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., the Court upheld a federal
statute allowing reorganization (as opposed to liquidation) of
railroads. The Court declared the statute within the bankruptcy
power-but without discussing uniformity. 112 Later, in the 3R Act
Cases, the Court unanimously allowed a new bankruptcy scheme for
railroads-even though the challenged statute was facially limited to
one section of the country and its provisions greatly varied from the
bankruptcy treatment allowed for other industries. "' The Court
asserted that ContinentalIllinois already had allowed "uniformity" to
stretch to different treatment for an industry with distinct
problems," l4 without admitting that Continental Illinois had not

Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 172-73
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
109. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 266 (1929).
110. Id. at 268.
111. Hanover, 186 U.S. at 190.
112. See Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac.
Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 669-73 (1935).
113. See Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102 (1974)
(popularly known as "The 3R Act Cases").
114. See id. at 158-59. The district court had found one possible use of one
section of the challenged act to violate the constitutional mandate of
uniformity. The Court declined to reach the issue because that eventuality had
not materialized. See id. at 157-58.
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mentioned the uniformity issue. 115 Next, the Court redefined
"uniformity" to allow Congress to deal specially with merely "local"
problems."16

Uniformity's meaning morphed into matching the

scope of the statute with the scope of the perceived evil. Allegedly,
no other railroad system at a different location had this problem

when the challenged statute had been enacted."l

7

Justice Douglas,
joined by Justice Stewart, dissented, pointing out that the challenged
meet the Court's established geographic definition of
statute did not
8
11
uniformity.

Gibbons, currently the final Supreme Court case on the
uniformity aspect of the Bankruptcy Clause, disallowed a statute that
provided tailored treatment to one named railroad. 119 While briefly

mentioning the Framers' alleged concern with private relief acts and
the pro-debtor stance of some states in the 1780s, the Court refused

115. But see, e.g., Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 169 (2001) ("Constitutional
rights are not defined by inferences from opinions which did not address the
question at issue."); Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S.
1, 18 (2000) ("This Court does not normally overturn, or so dramatically limit,
earlier authority sub silentio."). See also, e.g., BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB,
122 S. Ct. 2390, 2391-92 (2002) (declining to follow its own earlier
"statements... intended to guide further proceedings" pursuant to its
"customary refusal to be bound by dicta") (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
116. See The 3R Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 159 (asserting that this issue had
already been decided by Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank,
300 U.S. 440, 463 n.7 (1937)). This is another interesting and undiscussed
stretch. Wright did not deal with a bankruptcy statute with any provision
applicable to a limited section of the country. Congress had passed a statute
helping distressed farmers retain their land despite mortgage problems. See
Wright, 300 U.S. at 444-45. The Court voided the first statute as allowing
uncompensated takings of mortgage holders' property. See id. at 446.
Wright upheld the revised form of the Act that had been drafted to address the
Court's concerns. See id. at 470. One provision of the new Act bordered on a
taking by allowing foreclosure sales to be delayed several years. See id. at
467. The Court attempted to limit that potential defect by pointing out that the
new Act was an emergency measure and allowed each controlling court to
shorten the delay if the emergency had lifted locally. See id. at 462-64. This
regional variation was conclusorily stated to be legally identical to the allowed
incorporation of varying state laws. See id. at 462-64, 463 n.7.
117. See The 3R Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 159-61. The Court ignored that a
different railroad in a different section of the country might later develop the
same problem, yet not be entitled to the same special bankruptcy protections.
118. See id. at 180-85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
119. See Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
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to foreclose the type of limited statute allowed in the 3R Caseseven though (crediting the Court's descriptions) the recited, alleged
original concerns should have undermined the statute at issue in the
3R Cases, and even though that statute dealt in fact with only one
0

railroad system.12

In sum, the form limit requiring uniformity for bankruptcy
statutes has consistently been dealt with at the definition stage, and
with shallow opinions. The Court, furthermore, failed to enforce the
uniformity limit until Congress became so complacent about the
limit's manipulability that it targeted one debtor by name. 12 1 The
Court's willingness to stretch the term "uniform," however, seems

tied to perceived crises.
The Court used a similar, shallow definitional analysis when 22
it
first discussed the jurisdictional constraints in the Progress Clause. 1
In the Trade-Mark Cases, in 1879, the Court asserted that the
writings of authors and the discoveries of inventors both required

"originality."' 123

"Writings" was pronounced to be an expansive

term, but one still limited "to such [works] as are original, and are

120. The two Justices in concurrence made clear that a better legislative
record demonstrating the special national need for this very limited relief
would have satisfied their understanding of "uniform." See Gibbons, 455 U.S.
at 474-77 (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Brennan, J.).
121. Congruently, two major bankruptcy treatises have no index entry for a
constitutional issue regarding uniformity of federal laws. See COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY at 180, 1388-1389 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th ed., rev.
1996) (index pages released March 2002 with no relevant entry under
"Constitutional Issues," "Uniform," or "Uniformity"); 7 WILLIAM J. NORTON,
NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE 2D. at Index-58, Index-59, Index-

335, Index-336 (undated index pages with no relevant entry under
"Constitutional Matters," "Uniform," or "Uniformity").
122. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58
(1884) (holding that a photograph of Oscar Wilde is copyrightable); United
States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879) (popularly known as "The TradeMark Cases") (holding that use-based trademarks are not proper subjects for
Congress's power to enact either copyrights or patents because they are neither
the "Writings" of "Authors" nor the "Discoveries" of "Inventors"). The Court
handled "secure" by a slightly different, but still textual analysis. While the
Court did discourse broadly on other matters, the determinative point was
textual parallelism. "Secur[e]" refers textually to both "Authors" and
"Inventors," but inventors had never received common law, perpetual
protection under Anglo-Saxon common law. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.
591,661 (1934).
123. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
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founded in the creative powers of the mind," the "fruits of
intellectual labor."' 12 4 The Court produced absolutely no authority
for these presumably self-evident propositions. Nor did it engage in
any discussion of the Progress Clause's historical background. In
Sarony, in 1884, the Court deigned to produce an authority,
"Worcester," for the assertion that an "author" is "he to whom
anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a
work of science or literature."' 125 "Writings," congruently, include
"the literary productions of those authors ... [including] all forms of

writing, printing, engraving, etching, &c., by which the ideas in the
mind of the author are given visible expression."' 126 The Court's
longest historical or theoretical discussions occur in two cases that
rely on constitutional theory to help explicate statutes. 27 Never,
however, has the Court held a federal copyright or patent statute
because it breached the limits of the Progress
unconstitutional
28
1
Clause.
Based on the Bankruptcy Clause model (even with an eye on the

Court's analysis of the "Writings" of "Authors"), therefore, the Court
is likely to treat "limited Times" with similar shallow, definitional

moves. Considering the lack of financial crises in the copyright
industries, 129 Congress has no excuse for its willingness to overlook
124. Id.
125. Sarony, 111 U.S. at 57-58 (citing "Worcester").
126. Id. Presumably, the Court relied upon Worcester's Dictionary. See
Brief on the Part of the Defendant in Error at 3, Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.
v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (quoting "Worcester's Dict." as defining
"author" to mean "he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; creator;
maker; first cause.").
127. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-51
(1991) (construing Congress's allowance of copyright on factual
compilations); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1966) (construing
Congress's formulation of the inventiveness required for patentability).
128. The Court did void the first federal trademark statute as outside both the
Progress Clause and the Commerce Clause (as then narrowly construed). That
statute, however, did not enlarge common law substantive rights. See The
Trade-MarkCases, 100 U.S. at 82.
129. Rhetoric about crises abounds. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric
and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197 (1996) (arguing that
rhetoric is used as mere tactic to mask desire for more money and power).
However, the wish to make even more money does not render one near
bankruptcy. When discussing and enacting the CTEA, Congress made no
finding that any copyright industry was in financial danger. See Brief of
College Art Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 23,
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the "limited Times" form limit. This form limit may be treated with
more judicial respect, additionally, because it is reinforced with both
(i) an express internal fence stipulating the policy Congress must
pursue, and (ii) sharply defined
jurisdictional limits; the Bankruptcy
30
1
structure.
Clause has neither
B. Second Step: Means and Goals
Current balancing-approach cases work with a recognized
hierarchy of goals. The government may be required to target a goal
judicially labeled as legitimate, 131 substantial/important, 132 or
compelling. 133 Earlier "categorical" cases also look at means and
goals. For example, Lochner v. New York inquires whether New
34
York's maximum hour statute is within the state's police power.
In order to be within this power the statute has to pursue a
"legitimate [police power] end" and the gains to the legitimate goal
need to be more than "fanciful." 135 However, some means and some
goals are themselves illegitimate.
For example, the federal
government may use a conditional offer of funds to cajole state
action in many areas, but it cannot directly order non-judicial state
officers to perform the identical action. 13 6 As for illegitimate
Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (pointing out this hole in the legislative history
of the CTEA).
130. The word "bankruptcy" was not a well-defined term of art in 1789
British or American jurisprudence. See Hanover, 186 U.S. at 184-88
(discussing expansiveness of word "bankruptcies").
The Constitution,
furthermore, reads "on the subject of bankruptcies." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
4. Under the no surplusage canon, this phrase should mean something wider
than "bankruptcy laws."
131. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000)
(asserting that rational basis review requires only a legitimate purpose or
combination of purposes).
132. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 122 S.Ct. 1497, 1504
(2002) (requiring "substantial" purpose); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84 (characterizing
intermediate scrutiny as necessitating "important government objectives").
133. See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84 (characterizing strict scrutiny as
requiring "compelling government interests").
134. 198 U.S. 45 (1905): Aleinikoff, supra note 22, at 951 (describing
Lochner as the "Bete-noire of modern constitutional law").
135. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57-64. This example is culled from
Aleinikoff, supra note 22.
136. Compare Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932, (1997) (holding
that the federal government may not "direct the functioning of the state
executive" by ordering state law enforcement agencies to perform checks on
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is
purposes, no state may take otherwise legitimate action if its goal 137
animus.
majority
to
subject
to burden a group commonly
Furthermore, the government has no legitimate "interest in
preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial information in
of the public from making bad decisions
order to prevent members
' 38
with the information."'
Eldred raises an extraordinarily rare issue concerning
constitutional goals. Does the Progress Clause require that Congress
use the listed means only when it seeks the listed end? The Progress
Clause gives Congress "Power... To promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
The CTEA unquestionably uses the means
Discoveries."' 139
would-be purchasers of guns), with South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206
(1987) (holding that Congress may condition some highway funds on state
enactment of a minimum drinking age). However, some offers of funding are
unacceptable unconstitutional conditions. "[I]n some circumstances the
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the
point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion."' Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. The
unconstitutional conditions doctrine itself is hardly unproblematic. "The
Supreme Court's failure to provide coherent guidance on the subject is, alas,

Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines:
legendary."
UnconstitutionalConditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2001).
See generally, e.g., id. at 6-8 (presenting a "new unified theory of

unconstitutional conditions" based on a "conceptual analysis" of coercion
viewed against "all three dimensions of constitutional restraint: effects,

purposes, and conduct"); Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and
ConstitutionalRights, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 321, 352-53 (1935) (presenting a

classic argument for centrality of germaneness); Daryl J. Levinson, Framing
Transactions in Constitutional Law, Il1 YALE L.J. 1311, 1345-50 (2002)
(arguing that unconstitutional conditions cases are problematic because they

turn on untheorized decisions concerning which harms and benefits should be
aggregated); Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L.
REv. 1413, 1506 (1989) (asserting that recognized theories do not support
shape of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and suggesting that the
doctrine should be used to block distributional harms caused by government
overreaching).
137. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (holding that
ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, § 182 which disenfranchises persons who had
committed crimes of moral turpitude violates equal protection because the

purpose of its 1901 enactment was disenfranchising African Americans).

138. Thompson, 122 S. Ct. at 1507.
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, a.k.a., "Copyright and Patent Clause,"
"Intellectual Property Clause," or "Exclusive Rights Clause," but more
properly the "Progress Clause." See Pollack, supra note 2, at 1 n. 1.
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indicated in this Clause. 140 The means/goals issue in Eldred asks
what goals may Congress legitimately address by this specific
means. 14 1 The D.C. Circuit panel majority denied any goal limitation

140. The anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) raise the related means problem. May Congress use a different
means-statutory prohibition of technology-for the goal of "promot[ing]
Progress"? See Brief of Amicus CuriaeIntellectual Property Law Professors in
Support of Defendants-Appellants, Supporting Reversal, Argument I-l11 [Julie
Cohen], Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001),
available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/amicus/universal v reimerdes cohen.htm
(last visited Aug. 27, 2002) (arguing Congress may not prohibit circumvention
technology under Progress Clause, Necessary and Proper Clause or Commerce
Clause). But see Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (affirming injunction based on DMCA,
but without discussing Progress Clause/Commerce Clause junction), affg sub
nom. Universal City Studios v. Riemerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d , 346 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (issuing injunction against defendants). Depending on how the Court
decides Eldred, the issue with the anti-circumvention provisions may morph
into whether Congress may use the Commerce Clause to enact statutory
prohibition of technology for the purpose of rewarding copyright holders in a
way not allowed by the Progress Clause.
141. A possibly similar issue was raised concerning the now-defunct
manufacturing clause of Title 17. See Authors League of America v. Oman,
790 F.2d 220, 224 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that 17 U.S.C. § 601 was a
constitutional exercise of commerce power). The opinion is suspect, however,
because it overlooked the relevance of Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v.
Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982). See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, one could distinguish the issues by arguing (i) that the
manufacturing clause merely involved Congress's choice among possible
beneficiaries and survived equal protection analysis under rational basis
review, (ii) that the manufacturing clause merely involved Congress
conditioning a benefit on the grantees' helping a different constitutionally
allowable goal (without being an "unconstitutional condition" because of the
congruence between printers and disseminating works of authorship), or (iii)
that the manufacturing clause promoted a "useful art," the printing art, in the
United States. The requirement that a copy (or copies) of some works be
deposited with the Library of Congress in 17 U.S.C. § 407, has been held a
"necessary and proper" expansion of the progress power because it "sustains a
national library for the public use" which fosters the Progress Clause's
"primary purpose.., to promote the arts and sciences for the public good, not
to grant an economic benefit to authors and inventors." Ladd v. Law & Tech.
Press, 762 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding deposit requirement as
within Congress's power and not a violation of either the First or Fifth
Amendments, but failing to mention Gibbons), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1045
(1986).
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Clause's goal language to be merely a nonby declaring the Progress
42
1
"preamble."
binding
C. Third Step: Comparison
At this step, the Court asks if Congress has gotten close enough
to the constitutional ideal. Lochner asked if health gains were more
than merely fanciful.143 Rational basis review looks for a reasonable
relationship between the means chosen and some legitimate
governmental goal.144
Intermediate scrutiny requires that the
regulation at issue both serve a significant governmental interest and
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
Alternatively, intermediate scrutiny demands a
information. 145

substantial government interest that is directly advanced by the
challenged limitation; furthermore, the limitation may not be more
extensive than necessary to serve the asserted substantial government
interest.146 Strict scrutiny requires narrow tailoring to achieve a
The harshness of the
compelling government purpose. 4 7
comparison stage largely depends on the Court's approach to
legislative facts. Sometimes the Court is willing to hypothesize their
Court nitpicks through supporting
existence; sometimes the
48
congressional documents.'
142. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted
sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002).
143. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1905).
144. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000)
("[W]hen conducting rational basis review 'we will not overturn such
[government action] unless the varying treatment of different groups or
persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate
purposes that we can only conclude that the [government's] actions were
irrational."') (citation omitted) (brackets in original).
145. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 122 U.S. 1728,
1745 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting on other grounds).
146. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 122 S. Ct. 1497, 1498
(2002).
147. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2534-35
(explaining strict scrutiny as requiring the prohibition to be "narrowly tailored,
to serve.., a compelling state interest," which includes showing "that it does
not unnecessarily circumscribe protected expression.") (internal citation,
quotation marks, and editing marks omitted).
148. See, e.g., Thompson, 122 S. Ct. at 1507 ("[W]e have generally only
sustained statutes on the basis of hypothesized justifications when reviewing
statutes merely to determine whether they are rational."). But see Coenen,
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The Progress Clause's fit requirement has never been discussed
by the Supreme Court. This Article attempts to fill that gap, as well
as others.
We now have both a basic taxonomy of types of constitutional
commands constraining federal statutes, and a generalized flow chart
of judicial review of a statute's constitutionality. In the next Section,
I shall apply both analyses to the text of the Progress Clause as it
impacts the CTEA.
IV.

APPLICATION TO ELDRED V. ASHCROFT'S PROGRESS CLAUSE

ISSUES
A. "Limited Times"
The Court can decide Eldred under the Progress Clause with a
quite narrow opinion. It need only define the form provision,
"limited Times." Eldred wins if the Court adopts a definition of
"limited Times" that requires the length of the term to be set ex ante:
the bargain theory of copyright. 149 Congress could be told that it has
set by statute at
the power to grant copyrights only for a term already
50
the time the work first obtains statutory protection.
Such a definition is not barred by the Progress Clause's use of
the plural noun "Times." The plural may have been chosen to allow
both different length terms for different types of rights to exclude
(e.g., utility patents, design patents, copyrights), and renewal terms

supra note 73, at nn.442-48 (collecting articles criticizing Court's requirement
of legislative findings).
149. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 38, at 1162-64 (asserting that the
Copyright Clause includes a quid pro quo principle); see also Pollack, The
Owned Public Domain, supra note 21, at 291-99 (explaining and providing
authorities for the "bargain theory of patent").
150. An ex ante definition of "limited Times" would void the retrospective
extensions but not the prospective ones. The prospective ones, however,
would still be at risk from severability analysis; the proponents of the CTEA
were only interested in the legislation because of the retrospective extensions.
Both the legislative history and basic current value calculus support this
conclusion. See Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution:
"Have I Stayed Too Long?", 52 FLA. L. REv. 989, 1032 (2000); Dennis S.
Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 199, 202-05 (2002).
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(obtainable under a scheme enacted before the work became
5
protected).' '
The textual support for the ex ante reading is that any other
definition reduces "limited Times" to a straw barrier. If "limited
Times" means that Congress may at any time extend existing
copyrights by a calculable number of years' 5 2 (i.e., if the Court
allows terms to be re-set ex post), "limited Times" is vanishingly
weak. The phrase, however, would not be mere surplusage; in order
to reach the functional equivalent of eternal copyrights, Congress
continuously would have to pass new statutes expanding existing
copyright terms. That possibility, however, is the most troublesome
of the possible outcomes when viewed against the Framers' dislike
If the "limited Times" may be set ex post,
of corruption.
holders of soon-to-expire copyrights in
rational
economically
valuable works would repeatedly encourage legislation by donating
to congresspersons' campaign war chests--classic rent seeking
behavior. 153 The constitutionality of such an outcome would be
extremely odd because the Progress Clause of the Constitution is the
political descendent of the Statute of Monopolies, known to the
Framers' generation as the first win in the Whigs' fight against
corruption and monarchial over-reaching. 154 The Framers' and
Whigs' pejorative term "corruption," of course, translates into
Madison's despised "faction" and into the "agency failure" and "rent
seeking" of modem economic-speak.1 55
A narrow definitional solution might be very attractive to the
Court because it would leave open most of the complex policy and
fact-related issues possibly raised by the words "To promote the
151. See also Tyler T. Ochoa, Patentand Copyright Term Extension and the
Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYR. SOC'Y 19, 102 (2002)
(supporting same construction).
152. "Calculable" includes terms such as "fourteen years" and "fourteen
years after the death of the author."
153. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Free Software Foundation in Support of
Petitioners at 16, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618; see also, e.g., Davis,
supra note 150, at 998 n.30 (listing several major campaign contributions
which seem related to passage of CTEA); Christina N. Gifford, Note, The
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REv. 363, 385-86
(2000) (same).
154. See Brief of Pollack, supra note * (providing fuller discussion and
supporting authority).
155. See id.
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Progress of Science and useful Arts."' 56 Even if the Court has a lowprotectionist majority, it might wait to see if the public spotlight
would deflect Congress from tinkering around a narrow ruling.
Database legislation, after all, has not yet been enacted, even though
Feist was decided ten years ago. 157 Such a narrow decision,
however, has a significant downside. Congress and numerous
interested parties would expend enormous resources on drafting,
lobbying for, and lobbying against statutes that the Court might later
void.' 5 8
Alternatively, the Court could defer completely (or almost
completely) to Congress on the meaning of "limited Times."
"[L]imited Times" could be judicially set at any non-eternal period
that Congress might (theoretically) 159 have found to have a rational
156. See Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 736-37, 752 (1997)
(calling for more political debate on constitutional right to die); see also Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Speaking In a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1198
(1992) ("Measured motions seem to me right, in the main, for constitutional as
well as common law adjudication. Doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped,
experience teaches, may prove unstable.") (footnotes omitted). Disagreeing
with my view of which issue is more difficult, one amicus brief argues for
judicial restraint to be embodied in a decision striking retrospective extensions
as not promoting progress and prospective extensions as not severable, thus not
reaching "limited Times," which the brief considers more suited to legislative,
than to judicial, decision. See Brief Amici Curiae of the Progressive
Intellectual Property Law Association and the Union for the Public Domain in
Partial Support of Petitioners at 6-7, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618.
157. See, e.g., Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, S. 2291, 105th
Cong. § 2 (1998).
158. Similarly, the Court's expanding protection of state sovereign immunity
was first announced as a clear statement rule. See Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). Lobbyists converged on Congress, which
eventually passed many clearer statutes abrogating state sovereign immunity.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1122(b) (2000) (purporting to waive states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity for violation of federal trademark statute, the Lanham
Act); 17 U.S.C. § 511 (2000) (purporting to abrogate states' sovereign
immunity for copyright infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 296 (2000) (purporting to
abrogate states' sovereign immunity for patent infringement). The Court then
announced that clear statements were not enough; abrogation could not be
accomplished pursuant to Article I Powers; Congress needed to rely on postEleventh Amendment powers. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996). Third, the Court declared that the Appropriate Legislation Formula
was much narrower than clearly visible in earlier cases. See City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
159. "Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally even if source
materials normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for action are
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relationship to "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts." Such a decision, however, would require the Court to go
beyond a single definitional move. It would, at a minimum, have to
(i) define the goal section of the Progress Clause, and (ii) adopt the
toothless version of rational basis review. Any higher standard for
the comparison stage would, I believe, require Congress to supply
more empirical support for its choice of term length. These two
moves would collapse into one if the Court agrees with the D.C.

Circuit that the phrase "promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts" is mere surplusage, 160 despite the Court's repeated dicta
16
to the contrary. 1
B. "Promote"
"Promote" in the Progress Clause is the language relating the
means to the goal, the equivalent of "enforce" in the phrase,
"enforce... by appropriate legislation."' 162 "Promote," therefore,
should be the textual

locus for the Court's choice

on the

independence/deference continuum.
"Promote" is a word of virgin constitutional import. It appears
only twice in the Constitution:

the Preamble 163 and the Progress

otherwise silent, and their statutory classifications will be set aside only if no
grounds can be conceived to justify them." McDonald v. Bd. of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
160. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted
sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002).
161. See cases cited supra note 14.
162. Eight constitutional amendments contain a clause giving Congress (or
Congress and the states) "power to enforce [the amendment] by appropriate
legislation." U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, XVIII, XIX, XXIII, XXIV,
XXVI.
163.
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added). The possibly precatory nature of the
Preamble does not devalue the use of the word "promote" in the Progress
Clause because only the latter expressly confers a "power." The Supreme
Court has yet to base any substantive holding on the sole force of the Preamble
to the U.S. Constitution. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22
(1905) (holding that Massachusetts statute requiring small pox vaccination is
not unconstitutional; "[a]lthough th[e] [p]reamble indicates the general
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Clause. According to Supreme Court dicta, "[a]s employed [in the
Progress Clause], the terms 'to promote' are synonymous with the
words 'to stimulate,' 'to encourage,' or 'to induce."" 64 This
seeming-definition is supported only by citations to three earlier
Supreme Court cases, none of which pretend to provide the meaning
165
of the specific words, "To promote."
purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it has
never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the
[g]overnment of the United States or on any of its [d]epartments," relying on I
Story's Const. § 462). Justice Douglas did, however, include the Preamble in
his list of constitutional provisions supporting a right to privacy. See Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210-11 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). The Supreme
Court has relied on preambles to help explain both the Constitution and other
legal documents. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,
783-84 (1995) (relying in part on the preamble to proposed Amendment 73 to
the state constitution of Arkansas to determine its purpose); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828, 837 & n.8 (1976) (holding that commander of Fort Dix may
prevent candidates from entering to speak and personally distribute campaign
literature; "[o]ne of the very purposes for which the Constitution was ordained
and established was to 'provide for the common defence."'); id. at 852
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("But the Court overlooks.., one of the very
purposes for which the First Amendment was adopted was to 'secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."'); Cole v. Young, 351
U.S. 536, 552, 555, 557 n.20 (1956) (relying inter alia on preambles to
executive orders in determining that they went beyond bounds of enabling
statute); Price v. Forrest, 173 U.S. 410, 427 (1899) (allowing use of statutory
preamble as an aid to construction); see also Raymond B. Marcin, "Posterity"
in the Preamble and a PositivistPro-Life Position, 38 AM. J. JuRIS. 273, 27980 (1993) (arguing that the Preamble to the Constitution, by invoking "the
Blessings of Liberty to... our Posterity," counsels against allowing abortions
unless the mother's life is in danger); Eric M. Axler, Note, The Power of the
Preamble and the Ninth Amendment: The Restoration of the People's
Unenumerated Rights, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 431 (2000) (arguing that the
Preamble should guide court recognition of unenumerated rights protected by
the Ninth Amendment).
164. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 & n.10 (1973) (citing
Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 328 (1859); Bauer & Cie v.
O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913)); Mitchell v. Tilghman, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
287, 418 (1874); .
165. "[The current patent statute] was passed for the purpose of
encouraginguseful invention and promoting new and useful improvements by
the protection and stimulation thereby given to inventive genius, and was
intended to secure to the public, after the lapse of the exclusive privileges
granted, the benefit of such inventions and improvements." Bauer & Cie, 229
U.S. at 10 (providing no citation in support of this statement) (emphasis
added). "Patent laws have for their leading purpose the encouragementof
useful inventions." Mitchell, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 418 (citing CURTIS ON
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Turning to dictionaries, as the Court often does,166 provides no
help. 167 According to Johnson, "To promote" means "[t]o forward;
to advance," as in the sentence: "He that talks deceitfully for truth,
must hurt it more by his example, than he promotes it by his
arguments." ' 168 Webster agrees with Johnson and adds "to contribute
to the growth, enlargement or excellence of any thing valuable, or to
the increase of any thing evil; as to promote learning, knowledge,
virtue or religion . ,,169
These examples demonstrate that
"promote" provides no firm basis for choosing between review for
actual effects and review for legislative purpose or among levels of
deference to Congress. In order to learn more we need to consider
what Congress is allowed "To promote." We need to explicate "the
17 0
Progress of Science and useful Arts."
C. "Progressof Science and Useful Arts"17 '
Is this key phrase an enforceable limit or an unenforceable
aspiration? 172 If it is an enforceable limitation, it is an express
PATENTS

4th ed. § 33 1) (emphasis added). As for "to induce," someone's eye

seems to have slipped while copying out the citation. The passage cited
actually reads: "The true policy and ends of the patent laws.., are disclosed
in that article of the Constitution .... (Vide Constitution of the United States,
art. I, sec. 8, clause [8].) By correct induction from these truths ...
Kendall, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 328.

166. See Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Remains
a Fortress:An Update, 5 GREEN BAG: ENT. J. L. 51, 51-52 (2001) (providing
figures on the Court's massive use of dictionaries).
167. See also Pollack, supra note 2, at Part V.A. (discussing why
dictionaries are not good sources for the meaning of words in the U.S.
Constitution).
168. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1534

(1978 Librairie Du Liban facsimile of 4th ed. 1773). Johnson's second
definition is irrelevant. See id. ("[t]o elevate; to exalt; to prefer," as in "I will
promote thee unto very great honor.").
169. NOAH WEBSTER,

AN

AMERICAN

DICTIONARY

OF THE

ENGLISH

LANGUAGE at unnumbered page headed PRO PRO PRO (Foundation for
American Christian Education, 1998 facsimile of 1st ed. 1828). Webster adds
a third definition, "to excite; as, to promote mutiny." Id.
170. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Fried, supranote 69, at 76-78 (asserting that "aspirational

provisions are relatively few in the Constitution"; pointing out that the level of
scrutiny locates a provision on the continuum between limit and aspiration);
Tribe, supra note 21, at 1246 (comparing "[c]onstitutions that merely proclaim
political aspirations, like those of the former Soviet Union and its satellites"
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internal fence. As for the included words, "Science" means
"knowledge" in an anachronistically broad sense. 7 3 "[U]seful Arts"
means "technology."' 174 "Progress" has long been assumed to mean
"The Idea of Progress," i.e., qualitative improvement in human
knowledge. 175 The Supreme Court, however, has never adopted any
definition. 176
My research strongly evidences that the 1789
American word "progress" means "spread" and that alternative
readings are problematic in the context of the Progress Clause. I
read the Progress Clause as allowing Congress to pass only such
copyright and patent statutes as promote the
diffusion of knowledge
77
1
population.
the
throughout
and technology
with the U.S. Constitution which "create[s] an edifice of law" and "calls
certain institutions into being").
173. See WEBSTER, supra note 169, at unnumbered page headed
SCI SCI SLA:
SCIENCE, n.... (1) In a general sense, knowledge... (2) In

philosophy, a collection of the general principles or leading truths
relating to any subject ... (3) Art derived from precepts or built on

principles... (4) Any art or species of knowledge... (5) One of the
seven liberal branches of knowledge, viz. grammar, logic, rhetoric,
arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music...
Id.; see also 2 JOHNSON, supra note 168, at 1715 (providing even broader
definition of "science"). In 1789, "science" included moral philosophy, logic,
the nature of G-d, the nature of the human mind, metaphysics, physics, and
ontology); ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 397 (Modem Lib. ed.
n.d.). Literature, poetry, and drama were "sciences" as subparts of "rhetoric."
See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 2, at Part IV & nn.175-78 and accompanying text
(discussing breadth of "science" in 1789).
174. See John R. Thomas, The Patentingof the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C.

L. REv. 1139,

1169-75 (1999) (arguing that "useful Arts" means

"technology"); see also Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful
Arts, Part 11, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 487, 495-96 (1952) (arguing that "useful
Arts" means "mechanical arts"); Malla Pollack, The Multiple
Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents: Common Sense,
Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History,
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 86-90 (2002).

28 RUTGERS

175. See Pollack, supra note 2, at Part I.B.
176. See id. at nn.58-63 and accompanying text.
177. See id. passim (providing full argument). Qualitative improvement is

required

by

the

constitutional

word

pairs

author/writings

and

inventor/discoveries. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 346-47 (1991) (holding that originality is constitutionally required for

copyright protection); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 13 (1966)
(holding that non-obviousness
protection).

is constitutionally

required

for patent
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Whatever the word "Progress" means, the Clause's odd structure
should imbue its opening phrase with great authority. "To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts" is one of the few express
goal-limitations textually integrated into a grant of power in the
original Constitution. 178 The Court has already recognized it as
the
79

only subpart of Article I which specifies both means and goals. 1
The government is arguing for mere toothless rational basis
80
review with almost no limit on the goals Congress may pursue.'
Many commentators have assumed or argued that the Court would
automatically use rational basis review for this type of issue., 8' This
position approaches copyright as an economic regulation with a
merely incidental (if any) impingement on fundamental rights and no

relationship to any suspect class or goal.

The Progress Clause,

however, does not fit the textual paradigm of constitutional
commands under-enforced by mere rational basis review.
Rational basis review of federal statutes usually occurs when an
express external policy fence interacts with congressional action
taken under a separately granted power. In such situations, the
statute was not enacted for the purpose of impinging on the external

policy fence; the statute is one of general applicability. Purposefully
targeting the right protected by the policy fence results in a higher
standard of review. 182 The CTEA, however, was enacted for the
178. See Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's FirstAmendment, 48 UCLA L. REV.
1057, 1062 (2001) (asserting that Progress Clause is the only power granting
clause which specifies both means and purpose); see also supra Part II.C.3.
(discussing other somewhat similar subparts of the Constitution).
179. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
180. See Brief for the Respondent, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 at 8-9
("Congress has reasonably concluded that its consistent practice does promote
creativity and progress: ....secures appropriate international protection for
United States copyright holders' works.

.

.") (emphasis in original); id. at 19

(calling for "ordinary 'necessary and proper' standard of review).
181. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 150, at 1021-22; Jon M. Garon, Media &
Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the Convergence at the
Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 528 (1999).

182. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1994)
(holding that must-carry provisions of Cable Television Consumer Protection
& Competition Act of 1992 are "laws... singl[ing] out the press, or certain
elements thereof, for special treatment" thus requiring "some degree of
heightened First Amendment scrutiny") (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 534 (1987).
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specific purpose of expanding authors' rights to exclude (including
rights already transferred to non-authors). The CTEA has no other
more "general" applicability.
Furthermore, rational basis review occurs predominately where
the policy fence and the power were not drafted as a unit by the same
statesmen. The most important external fences are vague barriers
184
such as "due process,"' 183 and "no law" meaning not-some-laws.
Presumably, therefore, the drafting statesmen (and the ratifying
public) were unlikely to foresee many or most of the clashes between
these fences and later statutes. Brown v. Board of Education185 is a
thundering case precisely because, when drafted and ratified, the
Reconstruction Amendments had been measured against
segregated
18 6
schools and announced not to require their integration.
Additionally, the Article I power being fenced by mere rational
basis review generally is a power that was enumerated in the
Constitution primarily for the purpose of locating it institutionallywith Congress, as opposed to allowing the power to be wielded by
the executive or reserved to the states. 187 The power is usually
legitimate as a means toward an almost infinite number of
constitutionally legitimate policy goals.
Textually, the Progress Clause is quite different. It involves an
express internal fence; both the power and the fence on the power
simultaneously were placed inside the same clause by the same
drafters. The same drafters also curtailed the power with an internal
form provision: "limited Times." The power was enumerated, not
183. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
184. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
185. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
186. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understandingand the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1955) (asserting that
legislative history made "obvious" that the Amendment was originally

understood not to reach education, jury service, or voting); Michael W.
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947, 950-53 (1995) (stating that almost all scholarly investigators agree that
the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment did not include
school desegregation). But see id. at 953 ("The thesis of this Article is that the
consensus is wrong... [T]he belief that school segregation does in fact violate
the Fourteenth Amendment was held during the years immediately following
ratification by a substantial majority of political leaders who had supported the
Amendment.").
187. See

I

WILLIAM

WINSLOW

CROSSKEY,

CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

POLITICS

AND

411-15 (1953).

THE
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only to locate it institutionally, but primarily to cabin its strength. 8'
The drafters and ratifiers presumably had a clearer understanding of
how this power, this fence, and this form provision would interact in

practice. The absence of controversy over the Clause supports this
thesis; we have clear records of ratification debate over extensive
federal commerce power and over the possibility of a federal power

to grant "monopolies" other than those hedged in by the Progress
89
Clause. 1'
In short, the choice of this odd textual format signals a much

deeper original suspicion of legislative action pursuant to Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8, than of legislative action taken under other
congressional powers. We have no reason to believe that the drafters
or ratifiers considered cabining the allowable "exclusive Right[s]"

for "Authors"

and "Inventors"

to be an unimportant, merely

188. See id. at 486 ("It is clear that [the Copyright] power of Congress was
enumerated in the Constitution for the purpose of expressing its limitations.")
(emphasis in original); see also Karjala, supra note 150, at 221-22.
189. See Pollack, Purveyance and Power, supra note 21, at 99-116
(discussing drafting and ratification); see also LINDA LEVY PECK, COURT
PATRONAGE AND CORRUPTION IN EARLY STUART ENGLAND 220 (1990)
(asserting fight against early Stuart corruption and related monopolies was
central to American revolutionary thought); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 623 (paperback ed. 1998)
(same); Michael Conant, Anti-Monopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY
L.J. 785, 789-801 (1982) (reviewing anti-monopoly tradition of Britain and
Colonial America; concluding that the right to be protected against
government-supported monopolies is an unenumerated right protected by the
Ninth Amendment and incorporated against the states under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). The extent of Congress's
power over commerce was one of the key differences between the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution. See, e.g., I GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS,
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

186-95 (Da Capo Press

1974, reprint of 1897 ed.) (discussing failure of Continental Congress to
promote commerce); II JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1057 at 2 (3rd ed. 1958) ("The want
of this power [to regulate commerce] ... was one of the leading defects of the
confederation, and probably, as much as any one cause, conduced to the
establishment of the [C]onstitution."). The overly extensive federal power
over commerce, which might be used to disadvantage agricultural states, was
one of George Mason's leading objections to the Constitution. See GEORGE
MASON, OBJECTIONS OF THE HON. GEORGE MASON TO THE PROPOSED
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. ADDRESSED TO THE CITIZENS OF VIRGINIA. PRINTED
BY THOMAS NICOLAS,

reprintedin PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES 327, 331 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1968).
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economic regulation, or an area in which reasonable policy choices
spread around all 360 degrees of various historical British practices.
On the contrary, the public's rights against patent and copyright
'monopoly' were part of the doctrinal core of Whiggery; they were
important protections against tyranny1 90
and censorship. 191 As
James Madison agreed, "That is not a just government... where
arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of its
citizens that free 92use of their faculties, and free choice of their
occupations ....90

To highlight the textual oddity of the Progress Clause, compare
the actual Commerce Clause which merely specifies Congress's
jurisdiction' 93 with the following textually more limited substitute:
"Congress shall have the power.., to promote a civil, agrarian
society, by regulating Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several states, and with the Indian Tribes. . . ."

If the

Constitution read thus, would it have limited Congress's discretion to
set customs duties? To decide on farm subsidies? To regulate
railroads? Would the Constitution have been neutral in the 1790s
dispute over whether holders of federal securities should receive face
value regardless of whether they were speculators who had bought
the paper at a gigantic discount from citizen-soldiers faced with
losing their farms for non-payment of taxes? 194 Flat negative replies
are incompatible with respect for text or for original meaning in any
guise. The Progress Clause is much more textually cabined than this
hypothetical clause. Besides a goal limitation, 195 the Progress Clause
190. See generally Pollack, Purveyance and Power, supra note 21, passim.
191. See, e.g., LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 21-57, 114-42 (1968).
192. James Madison, Property,29 Mar. 1792, reprintedin I THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 598-99 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
193. "Congress shall have the power... [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
194. See PELATIAH WEBSTER, A Pleafor the Poor Soldiers, in POLITICAL
ESSAYS ON THE NATURE AND OPERATION OF MONEY, PUBLIC FINANCES AND
OTHER SUBJECTS PUBLISHED DURING THE AMERICAN WAR, AND CONTINUED

UP TO THE PRESENT YEAR, 1791, 306 (B. Franklin ed., reprint 1969) (1791)
(arguing against paying speculators face value because of such circumstances).
195. Hopefully, any perceived vagueness in the announced goal is clarified
by Pollack, supra note 2 (providing empirical information on 1789 uses of the
word "progress" and analyzing the goal limitation).
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recites a specific means, allows the means to be deployed only for
limited time periods, and has much sharper jurisdictional borders.
In order to discuss structural fences, I need to abandon my
attempt at substantive neutrality and embrace a policy reading of the
Clause. As the Court has often said, "limited Times" demonstrates
that eventual unlimited public use is the core goal of the Clause.
Accepting my reading of "Progress" as "spread" or "diffusion," the
express internal fence and the form provision of the Progress Clause
even more strongly should force copyright to function somewhat the
way the First Amendment has evolved. On either reading, copyright
is required to move dialogue into the public arena. Accepting my
translation, the Clause becomes primarilyan "engine of free
expression."' 196 This stronger reading of the Progress Clause defuses
tension between Madison's twin claims: first, that free information
flow was necessary to successful, republican government; 197 second,
that the Constitution did not require a bill of rights. 198 On either of
these views, reading the text of the Constitution, knowledge (or
"Science") is not merely "commerce"-Congress's power over
constrained textually than is its power over
"Science" is much more
199
commerce.
interstate
If the Progress Clause is a pre-First Amendment First
Amendment, a statute aimed at monetary reward of authors and
publishers is a statute passed for an impermissible purpose; therefore,
the review standard should be close to per se unconstitutionality.
Perhaps the first case to reach the unconstitutionality of a repeated
congressional gambit is unlikely to provoke emphatic judicial
196. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985).
197. See Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE
COMPLETE MADISON 314 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) ("Knowledge will
forever govern ignorance." Id. at 337 "A popular Government without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce
or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both." Id.).
198. See THE FEDERALIST No. 38 (James Madison); see also id. No. 84, at
579 (Alexander Hamilton) ("For why declare that things shall not be done
which there is no power to do? Why for instance, should it be said, that the
liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which
restrictions may be imposed?").
199. Cf Tribe, supranote 21, at 1249 (asserting in another context that
"each of the Constitution's numerous grants of power must be interpreted in
light of the others.").
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slamming of constitutional doors2 0 -but the Court did exactly that
20120
in INS v. Chadha, and City of Boerne v. Flores.2 °2 To public
domain theorists, Eldred has a strong resemblance to the Court's
view of both Chadha and Boerne. All three involve congressional
trifling with the Constitution-and the Constitution's supreme
guardian, the Supreme Court. The Court has repeatedly advised
Congress that the main purpose of the Progress Clause is not to
20 3
enrich copyright holders.

D. Summary ofApplication Insights
On textual grounds, the Progress Clause should require a type of
review similar to the unnamed, but quite potent, method used by the
Court in United States v. Morrison20 4 to decide if Congress had
"enforce[d]"
the Fourteenth Amendment with "appropriate
2
0
5
legislation."
Constitutionality should require both a tight fit and a
tight supporting record.20 6
200. See Coenen, supra note 73, at 1587-96 (arguing that "structural" or
"quasi-structural" rules which ask the political branches to reconsider their
actions with more deliberation "now occupy a large and prospering territory in
our constitutional [Supreme Court case] law.").
201. 462 U.S. 919, 944-45 (1983) (holding "legislative veto"
unconstitutional even though it was part of 196 statutes, some of which had
been in force since 1932).
202. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (curtailing sharply Congress's power under
the Fourteenth Amendment).
203. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) ("The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' Art. I, § 8, cl. 8."). For other
examples, see the cases listed supra note 14.
204. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
205. Id. at 619.
206. Eldred did not take a clear position on the standard of review for the
Progress Clause issue in either briefs or oral argument to the D.C. Circuit. See
Appellant's Opening Brief, Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(No. 99-5430) (Appellant's opening brief to the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals); Oral Argument of Mr. Lawrence Lessig on Behalf of Eric Eldred,
Appellant, Eldred, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001). However, Eldred and
several supporting amici have asked the Supreme Court to employ some form
of heightened review for the Progress Clause issue. See Brief for Petitioners at
31, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 ("Petitioners advance a per se rule banning
blanket retrospective extensions of copyright terms ... At a minimum, this
Court should adopt a rule of heightened review, requiring that any extensions
be 'congruent and proportional' to proper Copyright Clause ends," a standard
similar to that used in City of Boerne); Brief Amici Curiae of the American
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The Court generally chooses to speak narrowly and take one

small doctrinal step at a time. Will the Court be more than
commonly forthcoming in Eldred? Will it answer more questions
more fully than absolutely necessary to a decision? Or will it play
Old Father William and assert its power to refuse answers? As
discussed next, Eldred is a case where fuller answers are particularly
appropriate.
V. ELDRED As ANOTHER BROWN
Eldred has the potential to be the Brown v. Board20 7 of public
discourse theory-a Supreme Court opinion insisting on a novel,
"general welfare" 2 08-- enhancing, understanding of a constitutional
mandate. Brown, of course, is the paradigm of judicial activism
correctly applied. 20 9 No one, however, can doubt that Brown was
Association of Law Libraries et al. in Support of Petitioners at 5, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, No. 01-618 ("Amici believe that there must be a 'congruence and

proportionality' between the 'limited' time of copyright protection and the
need for such protection 'to promote' the progress of science and useful arts.");
id. at 14 ("In addition, there must be an adequate record to support the
rationale [suggested by Congress]."); Brief of Amici Curiae National Writers
Union et al. at 16-17, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (requesting that the Court
"carefully scrutinize[]" all "proffered congressional justifications for the
CTEA with... care."); Brief of Pollack, supra note *,at 2, 13 (requesting "a
high standard of review" including "some version of proportionality and
congruence review based on this Court's independent perusal of the legislative
record" such as used in Kimel and Morrison). As I have already argued, under
almost any meaning of "progress," the CTEA may fail even rational basis
scrutiny. See Pollack, supra note 2, at nn.33-57 and accompanying text; see
also Karjala, supra note 150, at 201. ("The CTEA, at least insofar as it applies
retroactively to works already in existence, cannot survive any test for review
that is stronger than a rubber-stamp version of 'rational basis' (if, indeed, it can
survive rational basis analysis).") (internal footnote omitted).
Professor
Karjala also supports a high standard of review. See id.at 201-03 (calling for
some form of heightened scrutiny).
207. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding so-called "separate but equal" state public
education unconstitutional).
208. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
209. See McConnell, supra note 186, at 952 ("Such is the moral authority of
Brown that if any particular theory does not produce the conclusion that Brown
was correctly decided, the theory is seriously discredited."); see also, e.g.,
Akhil Reed Amar, Becoming Lawyers in the Shadow ofBrown, 40 WASHBURN
L.J. 1, 1 (2000) (providing various positive readings of Brown, "the most
famous case of the twentieth century"); SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 36 (noting
that Brown v. Board of Education "may well be the most celebrated" decision
in the Court's history").
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anathema to a large segment of the contemporary population and
placed a major obligation on unwilling government players. 21° The
cases differ because Brown castigated mainly the states,211 while
Eldred would castigate Congress.
Eldred, nevertheless, has
substantial similarities to Brown, which, I hope, will lead the Court
to again take an active role in pushing legislative compliance. The
comparison below is based on Professor Fallon's approving contrast
of Brown's proper judicial activism
with the proper judicial
21 2
minimalism of Glucksberg and Quill.

Fallon asserts that "[i]n Brown, the underlying value of equality
was clearly articulated in the constitutional text. ...213

The

underlying value of access to knowledge and disparate opinions is
"clearly articulated" in the First Amendment as well as in the
Progress Clause. 214
According to Fallon, "widely shared
understandings confirmed the 'suspect' quality of race-based
discrimination" delegitimized in Brown.2 15 In Eldred, "widely
confirmed understandings confirm[] the 'suspect' quality" of
allowing special interests to control access to knowledge and
disparate opinions.216 According to Fallon, "school segregation
210. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 248 (2d
ed. 1986) (providing brief overview of practical problems of implementing
Brown); Bickel, supra note 186, at 2 ("The [Brown] Court knew, of course,
that its judgment would have an unparalleled impact on the daily lives of a
very substantial portion of the population, and that the response of many of
those affected would be in varying degrees hostile.").
211. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), of course, issued the same
integration order to schools in the District of Columbia, a non-state.
212. See Fallon, supranote 7, at 144-47 (comparing right to die cases from
1996 Term with Brown and concluding that the Court acted properly in both
instances).
213. Id.
at 146.
214. The value of wide access is supported by both the Madisonian
deliberative-democracy type of Free Speech theory and its main rival, the
Holmesian marketplace-of-ideas concept. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 17580 (explaining this basic duality).
215. See Fallon, supra note 7, at 146.
216. See, e.g., Garon, supra note 181, at 585-98 (discussing the negative
social aspects of media convergence and oligopoly).
The "press" in 1791 was not the New York Times or the Wall Street
Journal. It did not comprise large organizations of private interests,
with millions of readers associated with each organization. Rather, the
press then was much like the Internet today. The cost of a printing
press was low, the readership was slight, and anyone (within reason)
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presented a paradigmatic case of the 'prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities.., which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect

minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry'217 -representational reinforcement.218 The public
could become a publisher ....
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 183 (1999); see

Eben Moglen, The Invisible Barbecue, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 945-54 (1997)
(attacking the Communications Act of 1996 as a corrupt bargain between the
economically and the politically powerful which will perpeturate public lack of
informed input into political decision-making). The communication giants'
power is premised on government commodification (such as allocation of
broadcasting spectrum and creation of copyright "property") combined with
government refusal to regulate content chosen by the empowered "private"
entities. This power configuration has been challenged at many different
points. See LESSIG, supra, 184-85 (arguing that originalist reading of First
Amendment translated to deal with modem technology would prevent
government empowerment of large communication entities premised on
government regulation of spectrum use); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT 172-75 (2001) (arguing that Congress's expansion of copyright
and related statutes protect current holders of large market share while
perversely hurting public access to works and delaying expansion of new
technology); CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 146-59 (2001) (arguing against
large communications businesses being exempt from content regulation in the
name of the First Amendment; arguing for reading the First Amendment as
encouraging regulation of the communications markets in order to promote
deliberative democracy); see also RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M.
SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 107-19 (paperback ed. 1996) (tying
commercial culture to destruction of deliberation and deliberative-self, a
destruction that commercial interests cloak with the mythic designation of
"freedom"); SUNSTEIN, supra, at 143, 150 (arguing against the growing
modem identification of the First Amendment with "government respect[ing]
consumer sovereignty," which he likens to the Lochner Court's protection of
wage earners' "choice" to work long hours for low wages).
217. Fallon, supra note 7, at 146 (quoting the famous fourth footnote in
United States v. Caroline Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities ....
")); see also Ginsburg,
supra note 156, at 1206-07 (asserting that judicial activism was proper in
Brown because the disadvantaged were institutionally blocked from redress
through congressional action).
218. In this situation (where well-healed special interests push for
commercialization of a key component of representational government)
representational reinforcement (speaking for persons under counted by the
political process) is equivalent to the other main reason for judicial review,
speaking for constitutional values forgotten in the heat of political dispute. See
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domain presents a paradigmatic case of collective action failure-a
now well-understood political phenomenon that the Court has not yet
recognized.219 While the Court may not be ready to correct all
collective action failure, the Progress Clause was drafted with limits
triggered by the history of English corruption. In this one clause, the
Framers left textual commands supported by clear historical material
demonstrating a deep distrust of special interest legislation in this
specific area of government action.2 20 Judicial activism seems
required by the unusually tight crafting of this one small piece of the
Constitution.
In Brown, the Court moved ahead of the public despite
"disagreement" about constitutional limits. As with Brown, in
Eldred, "[t]he Court [may] justifiably hope, and even anticipate, that
its ruling w[ill] help to sway opinion and forge an informed
consensus on the reasonableness, and ultimately the rightness, of its
decision.,, 22 1 Both Congress and the so-called Copyright Industries
recognize that the American public has not internalized current
copyright statutes as moral norms-hence the repeated calls for
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY

AND DISTRUST:

A THEORY OF JUDICIAL

88-104 (Harvard University Press 1980) (discussing judicial help for
politically under valued citizens); Bickel, supra note 186, at 23-28 (discussing
judicial support for constitutional values). But see Aleinikoff, supra note 22, at
985 (arguing that these alleged flaws in the legislative process support no more
than a judicial remand to Congress); Coenen, supra note 73, at 1582 (asserting
that the Court often "in effect 'remands' constitutionally controversial
programs to the political branches ....
").
REVIEW

219. See, e.g., Dennis Karjala, Copyright Protection of OperatingSoftware,
Copyright Misuse, and Antitrust, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

(1999)

161, 181-82
(discussing Congress's inability to lower copyright holders'

entitlements); Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalizationof Technology Law,

15

BERKELEY TECH.

L.J. 529, 532-33 (recognizing Congress's institutional

problems in protecting the pubic domain as the major catalyst of the

"constitutionalization" of copyright scholarship); Jessica Litman, Copyright
Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989) (same);

Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L.

REV. 19 (1996) (detailed discussion of collective action failures); Netanel,

supra note 11, at 66 n.278 (2001) (summarizing collective action failures);
William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal

Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139 (1996) (discussing his
personal experience with influence of special interests).

220. See generally Pollack, Purveyance and Power, supra note 21, passim

(providing detailed discussion of historical tie between proto-intellectual
property grants and government corruption, a.k.a agency failure).
221. Fallon, supra note 7, 146.
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copyright "education. ' 222 Therefore, in Eldred, as in Brown, the
Court can easily223craft "a morally compelling interpretation of an
accepted norm."
Finally, the real world settings are as well known in Eldred as
they were in Brown. According to Fallon, in 1954, no one could
doubt that segregation's "social meaning" involved "wall[ing]"
African-Americans into "a position of... inferiority." 224 Today, no
one can doubt that the "social" meaning of the CTEA is permitting
major corporate copyright holders the power to wall-off the public
from both a massive quantity of cultural material and to render
impotent a newly available engine of free expression, the Internet,
which might otherwise allow any concerned citizen to be a potent
225
publisher and distributor.

222. See, e.g., Education Programs Needed to Combat Consumer Piracy,
Experts Say, in 64 BNA'S PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 1571, at 1214 (May 3, 2002) (reporting statements favoring public education made by
numerous industry spokespersons during "Copyright Conference," Wash.
D.C., April 24 & 25, 2002, sponsored by PTO and Copyright Office, including
representatives of the Software & Information Industry Assn., Business
Software Alliance, Assn. of Am. Univs.).
223. Fallon, supra note 7, at 146.
224. Id. at 147.
225. The Copyright Act's dampening effect on the democratic impact of the
Internet is enhanced by other new pseudo-copyright statutes such as the
DMCA and UCITA. The sources recognizing the potential of the Internet are
legion, even within United States judicial opinions.
The Internet... offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad
avenues for intellectual activity ...While "surfing" the World Wide
Web, the primary method of remote information retrieval on the
Internet today.., individuals can access material about topics ranging
from aardvarks to Zoroastrianism. One can use the Web to read
thousands of newspapers published around the globe, purchase tickets
for a matinee at the neighborhood movie theater, or follow the
progress of any Major League Baseball team on a pitch-by-pitch basis.
Aschroft v. ACLU, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 1703 (2002) (internal citations and
footnotes omitted); Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,
409 (E.D. Pa. 2002) ("In providing even filtered Internet access, public
libraries create a public forum open to any speaker around the world to
communicate with library patrons via the Internet on a virtually unlimited
number of topics."; holding invalid under strict scrutiny a federal statute
conditioning funding on library's use of Internet filtering).
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VI. CONCLUSION

The Court in Eldred may create a review standard de novo. In
this Article, I try to form a standard by inspecting the structure of the
unusual, and unusually detailed, text of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
of the Constitution while remaining relatively detached from the
meaning of its words. The Court may decide the Progress Clause
issue with a narrow opinion merely supplying a partial definition of
"limited Times." If the Court reaches the congruence of means and
goals, respect for the Constitution's text requires both a tight fit
between the means chosen and the Constitution's required goal of
"promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts," and a targeted
congressional record demonstrating the non-speculative nature of the
tight fit.
The Supreme Court, furthermore, should provide unstinted
analysis of the Progress Clause issues in Eldred. Without firm, full
guidance,6 Congress, like Old Father William, will "do it again and
again."

22

226. See CARROLL, supranote 1, at 65.

